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Protecting the Lydias, Linas, and Tinas from Sex 
Trafficking: A Call to Eliminate Ambiguities of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1591 
I. Introduction 
To honor the 200th anniversary of the “most glorious measure that had 
ever been adopted by any legislative body in the world”1 and its champion, 
William Wilberforce, the 110th Congress passed the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA).2 
William Wilberforce, the Act’s namesake, fought tirelessly for over 
eighteen years to pass the first piece of legislation aimed at ending slavery 
in Great Britain, the Slave Trade Act of 1807.3 Wilberforce spoke about the 
horrors inflicted upon those torn from their homes and subjected to the 
“arbitrary will and wanton caprice of others.”4 Inspired by his passionate 
words that “[n]ever, never will we desist until we extinguish every trace of 
this bloody traffic to which our posterity, looking back to the history of 
those enlightened times, will scarce believe that it has been suffered to exist 
so long to disgrace and dishonor this country,”5 Congress embraced 
Wilberforce’s legacy in the fight to end modern-day slavery with the 
passage of the TVPRA.6 
Although abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865,7 slavery, or, 
as it is known today, human trafficking, remains a prevalent issue as the 
second-largest criminal industry in the world, totaling over thirty-two 
billion dollars in market value.8 Sex trafficking, defined as forcing or 
                                                                                                                 
 1. WILLIAM HAGUE, WILLIAM WILBERFORCE: THE LIFE OF THE GREAT ANTI-SLAVE 
TRADE CAMPAIGNER, at xvii (2007) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044; Slave Trade Act of 1807, 47 Geo. 3, sess. 1, ch. 36. 
 3. HAGUE, supra note 1, at xv-xviii. 
 4. Id. at xvi. 
 5. 154 CONG. REC. H10902 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 6. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, 122 Stat. at 5069. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 8. Sex Trafficking, INT’L JUST. MISSION, 1, http://www.ijm.org/sites/default/files/ 
resources/Factsheet-Sex-Trafficking.pdf (last visited May 29, 2013). 
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coercing a person to engage in a commercial sex act, constitutes 43% of 
human trafficking in the world.9 
Sex traffickers target vulnerable people to traffic and exploit.10 Lina, age 
thirteen, and Sinan, age sixteen, were best friends who struggled to find 
work to help support their families.11 They took odd jobs when they could, 
but often went hungry when work was unavailable and money was scarce.12 
Desperate to find work, Lina and Sinan jumped at the opportunity brought 
to them by Sinan’s aunt to work in a coffee shop.13 Unfortunately, Sinan’s 
aunt lied and trafficked the girls into a brothel.14 
While Sinan managed to escape, Lina was held captive in the brothel.15 
Like the other women and girls trapped there, Lina was beaten, forced to 
drink as much alcohol as the customers, and raped repeatedly, day after 
day—until she was rescued by Sinan.16 Lina’s story, unfortunately, is a 
common one.17 Sex traffickers often use lies and false promises of work to 
lure young women and children into sex trafficking.18 
Lydia, instead of being tricked like Lina and Sinan, was kidnapped.19 
With promises of finding work as a model, Lydia, age sixteen, met a 
woman for dinner one night.20 The after-dinner drink proved devastating.21 
Lydia awoke the next day, after being drugged the night before, to find 
herself in a terrifying situation.22 She was told that she was now in a foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Human Trafficking: The Facts, UNITED NATIONS, 1, http://www.unglobalcompact 
.org/docs/issues_doc/labour/Forced_labour/HUMAN_TRAFFICKING_-_THE_FACTS_-
_final.pdf (last visited May 29, 2013). 
 10. Sex Trafficking in the U.S., POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/human-
trafficking/sex-trafficking-in-the-us (last visited May 29, 2013). 
 11. IJM Cambodia: Brave Survivors Help Rescue Girls from Brothel, INT’L JUST. 
MISSION (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.ijm.org/news/ijm-cambodia-brave-survivors-help-
rescue-girls-brothel. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Sex Trafficking in the U.S., supra note 10. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 146 CONG. REC. H2675, H2683 (May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Smith) Lydia’s 
story is “an amalgamation of several true stories of women and girls who have been 
trafficked in Eastern Europe in recent years.” Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
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country and was the property of a man.23 That man threatened her, took 
away her passport and immigration documents, and convinced her that she 
was in debt to his agency for $35,000.24 When Lydia rebelled, the man beat 
her, raped her, allowed other men to gang-rape her, and deprived her of 
food and water for three days.25 She was prostituted for six months before 
the local police raided the brothel.26 Because she did not have immigration 
papers, Lydia was arrested and placed in prison before someone eventually 
recognized her as a trafficking victim.27 
Children like Lydia and Lina are especially vulnerable to being 
trafficked.28 Traffickers can easily manipulate children by making a child 
believe that she29 is loved—by giving her attention—only to coerce the 
child into commercial sex activity by promising what the child perceives to 
be love and attention.30 
Tina met a man who courted her and convinced her that he loved her.31 
He then persuaded her to move to Ohio with him.32 She was fourteen years 
old at the time.33 Upon arriving, he explained that she had to prove she 
loved him by “working” the streets so they could have their dream home.34 
When she resisted, he had his friends rape her.35 He then told her she could 
have avoided the rape if she had simply done what he had said.36 Tina was 
forced to walk the streets nightly, engaging in prostitution.37 If she did not 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Tina Frundt, Enslaved in America: Sex Trafficking in the United States, 
WOMEN’S FUNDING NETWORK, http://www.womensfundingnetwork.org/resource/past-
articles/enslaved-in-america-sex-trafficking-in-the-united-states (last visited May 30, 2013). 
 29. For ease of writing, the author uses the female pronouns in reference to victims 
because the majority of children trafficked are young girls. However, sex trafficking is a 
significant problem that affects both genders. See Sex Trafficking, supra note 8 (noting that 
80% of victims are female). 
 30. See Frundt, supra note 28. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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meet her nightly quota, she was repeatedly beaten, denied food, and locked 
in a closet.38 
These stories only tell the tales of three of the two million children, both 
in the United States and worldwide, who are taken from their homes each 
year and forced into the commercial sex trade.39 In its fight against this 
horrendous problem, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 (TVPA).40 Eight years later, the TVPRA expanded on the 
original TVPA, embracing the goals established to provide a 
comprehensive approach to ending modern day slavery.41 Those goals 
focused on the three “Ps”: protection, prevention and prosecution.42 
Protection efforts are aimed at creating programs focused on providing 
shelter, food, legal support, and psychological care to identified trafficking 
victims.43 Victims who are not United States citizens may be eligible for 
temporary residence visas.44 Once victims are identified, the Department of 
Health and Human Services assists them in securing educational and 
vocational opportunities so that they do not fall prey to trafficking again.45 
However, in order to receive the protection needed, the person must first be 
recognized as a trafficking victim.46 Because a trafficking victim often does 
not view herself as such, victims are often identified, if at all, by law 
enforcement officers or nongovernmental organizations that come into 
contact with the victim.47 
Programs established to meet Congress’s goal of prevention focus on 
identifying victims by increasing public awareness.48 Training programs 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8. 
 40. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. 
 41. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5069; Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human 
Trafficking, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www. 
acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/fact-sheet-child-victims-of-human-trafficking. 
 42. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, § 102(a), 114 Stat. at 1466. 
 43. See id. § 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466-69 (describing the inadequacies and lack of 
protection efforts and the goal of the legislation); see also id. at § 102(b)(24), 114 Stat. at 
1469. 
 44. Id. § 107(c)(3), 114 Stat. at 1477. 
 45. Id. § 107(b)(1), 114 Stat. at 1475-76. 
 46. Id. § 107(b)(1)(A), 114 Stat. at 1475. 
 47. HEATHER J. CLAWSON & NICOLE DUTCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING: INHERENT CHALLENGES AND PROMISING 
STRATEGIES FROM THE FIELD 3-4 (2007), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/human 
trafficking/IdentVict/ib.pdf. 
 48. Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 41. 
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target those who may come in contact with a trafficking victim: law 
enforcement, medical personnel, nongovernmental organizations, and social 
workers, among others.49 These programs train personnel how to identify a 
trafficking victim, how to interact with that person, and how to secure the 
needed help, from food and shelter to psychological care.50 
To effectuate the goal of “just and effective punishment of traffickers,”51 
Congress established criminal statutes and provided prosecution tools for 
both federal and state agencies.52 Congress identified two severe forms of 
sex trafficking as: (1) causing anyone to commit a commercial sex act 
through force, fraud, or coercion, or (2) causing a person under the age of 
eighteen years to commit a commercial sex act.53 The criminalization of 
severe forms of sex trafficking is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591.54 
Congress formally amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in the TVPRA, adding 
reckless disregard as a sufficient mens rea and adding a special evidentiary 
provision for the government when prosecuting severe forms of sex 
trafficking.55 The evidentiary provision in § 1591(c), addressing the mens 
rea requirement of the victim’s status as a minor,56 has been subject to 
varying interpretations.57 One court held that this provision allowed the 
government to prove the mens rea of the victim’s age in one of three 
alternatives—by proving that the defendant either (a) knew the victim’s 
age, (b) recklessly disregarded the victim’s age, or (c) merely had a 
reasonable opportunity to observe.58 Another court held that when the 
government prosecutes under the reckless disregard standard, the 
government must prove an additional element—that the defendant had a 
reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.59 Aiming to increase the 
                                                                                                                 
 49. CLAWSON & DUTCH, supra note 47, at 4. 
 50. Id. at 4-5. 
 51. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, § 102(a), 114 Stat. at 1466. 
 52. See id; see also id. § 112, 114 Stat. at 1486-90. 
 53. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2012). 
 54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012); see also Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2011, H.R. 2830, 112th Cong. § 212 (2011) (proposing a name 
change of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to “severe forms of trafficking”).  
 55. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, sec. 222, § 1591, 122 Stat. 5044, 5069. 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). 
 57. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 30-34 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2010). 
 58. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 34. 
 59. Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *6-7. 
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number of prosecutions of sex traffickers,60 Congress inadvertently 
hindered its goal of prosecution by passing an ambiguous statute. 
The ambiguity arising from the alternative interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 
1591 can have a detrimental effect on all three of Congress’s goals. 
Prosecutors may elect to avoid prosecuting under this statute while the law 
remains unsettled.61 Or the prosecutor may charge the defendant under a 
different statute, creating unintended negative consequences for both the 
victim and the fight to end sex trafficking.62 
If the perpetrator is not prosecuted as a sex trafficker, the victim may be 
less likely to be recognized as a trafficking victim.63 This identification is 
crucial for determination of eligibility for federally funded programs, such 
as immigration services.64 In addition, non-identification may cause the 
victim to lose her right to mandatory restitution for trafficking victims 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1593.65 
Prosecuting sex traffickers under an offense that carries a lighter 
punishment may also decrease the probability that a victim will testify or 
cooperate with the prosecution, which significantly reduces the likelihood 
of success.66 Because of the heinous methods of control that sex traffickers 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See AMY FARRELL ET AL., NE. UNIV. INST. ON RACE & JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING AND 
IMPROVING LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: FINAL REPORT 22 (June 
2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222752.pdf. 
 61. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.230 (2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm 
#9-27.230. Federal prosecutors are given broad discretion in choosing when and how to 
prosecute and under which laws. Id. Logically, prosecutors consider ease of prosecution 
under a particular statute as well as the prosecutor’s familiarity with a particular statute when 
selecting under which statute to charge. See, e.g., Alicia W. Peters, Trafficking in Meaning: 
Law, Victims, and the State 87 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231589.pdf. 
 62. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010) (not imposing a minimum mandatory 
sentence for causing a minor to engage in prostitution). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)-(2) 
(2012) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of ten to fifteen years imprisonment, 
conditional on the age of the minor). 
 63. See Linda Smith & Samantha Healy Vardaman, A Legislative Framework for 
Combating Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (2010) 
(discussing the ramifications for charging sex traffickers under non-trafficking statutes); see 
also Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 41. 
 64. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012) (addressing certification as human trafficking 
victims in order to receive services); see also Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 287. 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 1593. 
 66. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 95 (2007). 
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exert over their victims,67 victims are often terrified of testifying against 
perpetrators.68 This fear is amplified if the victim knows that the perpetrator 
will not be subject to a significant prison term because the perpetrator is 
charged with a lesser offense.69 Charging perpetrators with lesser offenses 
frequently results in shorter prison sentences.70 Because of the 
psychological terror that the trafficker instills in the victim, the victim will 
fear that the trafficker will return to traffic her once more or that he will 
harm her family once he is released from prison.71 
Finally, by charging the perpetrator under a lesser offense, efforts aimed 
at decreasing the demand in the commercial sex industry and, therefore, 
decreasing the frequency of sex trafficking, are wasted.72 Sex trafficking is 
the second-largest criminal industry in the world because it is so 
profitable.73 Without imposing significant risks on the perpetrators, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Sex traffickers impose fear in their victims through a systematic process known as 
“grooming.” Domestic Sex Trafficking: Criminal Operations of the American Pimp, POLARIS 
PROJECT 3, http://www.polarisproject.org/resources/resources-by-topic/sex-trafficking (scroll 
through .pdf documents; then select “Domestic Sex Trafficking”) (last visited July 10, 
2013). Methods of grooming include beating, burning, and raping the victim as well as 
emotional abuse, removing the victim from family and friends, and creating an environment 
where the victim must depend on the perpetrator. Id. Traffickers often impose a fear of law 
enforcement which may impair a victim’s ability to report or testify. Id. 
 68. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 76 (statement 
of Dorchen A. Leidholt, Director, Sanctuary for Families’ Ctr. for Battered Women’s Legal 
Servs.). 
 69. Id. at 94 (statement of Ms. Florrie Burkey, Safe Haven). 
 70. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010) (not imposing a minimum mandatory 
sentence for causing a minor to engage in prostitution). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)-(2) 
(imposing mandatory minimum sentence of ten to fifteen years imprisonment, conditional on 
the age of the minor); see also SHARED HOPE INT’L, PROTECTED INNOCENCE CHALLENGE: 
STATE REPORT CARDS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTION FOR THE NATION’S 
CHILDREN: 2012, at 117-219, available at http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
09/ProtectedInnocenceChallenge_Final_2012_web2.pdf (providing a state-by-state analysis 
of sex trafficking laws, including each state’s criminal statutes and punishment ranges). 
 71. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 76 (statement 
of Dorchen A. Leidholt, Director, Sanctuary for Families’ Ctr. for Battered Women’s Legal 
Servs.). 
 72. Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 267-68 (discussing supply and demand 
principles in the commercial sex industry). 
 73. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8. 
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lengthy prison terms, the profits of sex trafficking remain as powerful 
incentives because the corresponding risk is not perceived to be that great.74 
In order to combat sex trafficking effectively, Congress’s goals of 
protection, prevention, and prosecution must work in unison.75 Because 
prosecution goals are hindered by an ambiguous statute, both the protection 
and prevention goals are also impeded.76 As a result, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 must 
be amended so that prosecutors can effectively charge and prosecute sex 
traffickers, slowing the pace of the world’s fastest growing criminal 
industry: human trafficking.77 
In Part II, this comment applies traditional statutory interpretation 
methods to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in an attempt to determine its meaning. Part 
III discusses the repercussions of the ambiguity inherent in § 1591 on 
Congress’s goals of prevention, protection, and prosecution, as well as the 
impact on state anti-human trafficking programs. Part IV presents the 
arguments for and against holding a defendant strictly liable for the crime 
of sex trafficking of minors. Part V proposes changes to § 1591 that 
eliminate the ambiguities found in the current statute and, in turn, lead to 
more effective prosecutions of sex traffickers. 
II. Determining the Meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 
Inspired by the heart-wrenching stories of children forced into 
prostitution, occurring daily both abroad and in the United States, Congress 
passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.78 Through this Act, 
Congress authorized the Department of Justice to prosecute those who 
commit sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or coercion.79 Under this 
version of the statute, the prosecution was required to prove the defendant 
knew the victim was less than eighteen years of age.80 
When § 1591(a) was amended in 2008, Congress added reckless 
disregard as an alternative mens rea for proof the perpetrator caused a 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See generally Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63 (discussing the need for a strong 
legislative framework in order to affect the supply and demand in the commercial sex 
industry). 
 75. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(24) (2012). 
 76. FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 22. 
 77. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8. 
 78. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 
1464. 
 79. Id. § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1487. 
 80. See id. 
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minor to engage in a commercial sex act.81 A special evidentiary provision 
was added to § 1591(c),82 stating that in a prosecution under § 1591(a), the 
government need not prove the defendant knew the person caused to 
engage in a commercial sex act was under the age of eighteen years if the 
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person.83 These 
amendments left prosecution and defense lawyers asking several questions. 
What does the government have to prove regarding the age of the minor? 
Must the government prove the defendant knew the victim’s age or that the 
defendant recklessly disregarded the victim’s age? Or rather, must the 
government only show that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to 
observe the victim? Furthermore, what circumstances establish a 
“reasonable opportunity to observe”? 
A. Applying Traditional Methods of Statutory Interpretation to 18 U.S.C. § 
1591 
To answer these questions, prosecution and defense teams must consider 
how a court might interpret the statute.84 Traditional interpretation methods 
are most likely to be applied, including analyzing the plain language of the 
statute, reviewing the legislative history of the TVPA and its amendments, 
evaluating the common statutory scheme of federal sex crimes against 
children, and exploring the constitutional implications of the alternative 
interpretations. 
1. Plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 
Courts approach statutory interpretation by first considering the language 
of the statute itself.85 If the meaning of the statute is clear, “that language 
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”86 Ordinary grammatical rules 
apply.87 
  
                                                                                                                 
 81. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, sec. 222, § 1591(a), 122 Stat. 5044, 5069. 
 82. Prior to 2008, subsection (c) provided definitions for a variety of words found in the 
sex trafficking statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (Supp. II 2008). 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2012). 
 84. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 7-8 (2002). 
 85. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 
 86. Id. 
 87. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (citing 
grammatical structure in analysis of meaning of statute). 
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Reading 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) on its own may initially seem clear and 
unambiguous: “In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the 
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited, 
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the 
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not 
attained the age of 18 years.”88 From just that subsection, it appears that the 
Government must only show that “the defendant had a reasonable 
opportunity to observe” the minor to satisfy the mens rea of the age element 
of the person recruited.89 However, that reading of subsection (c) may not 
be consistent with the statutory scheme of § 1591 as a whole.90 When 
reading subsection (a)(1), as referenced in subsection (c), ambiguity is 
revealed. 
Whoever knowingly—in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, 
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a 
person; . . . knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that 
means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in 
subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used 
to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the 
person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to 
engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b).91 
A plain reading of subsection (a)(1), applying normal grammatical rules, 
establishes the mens rea of the age element as knowledge or reckless 
disregard.92 In light of subsection (a)(1), subsection (c) could be interpreted 
in two different ways.93 
                                                                                                                 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). 
 89. See id. The next logical question stemming from that reading of the statute asks 
what circumstances satisfy “reasonable opportunity to observe.” See supra Part II.B. 
 90. One judge found that reading to be inconsistent with the mens rea required in § 
1591(a). United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 
July 27, 2010). Courts interpret statutes consistently with the statutory scheme as a whole. 
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1972) (describing the canon of statutory 
construction as “in pari materia”). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). 
 92. If the inapplicable clauses are ignored, the subsection reads: 
[W]hoever knowingly . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, 
obtains, or maintains by any means a person . . . knowing, or in reckless 
disregard of the fact, . . . that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and 
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First, subsection (c) could stand on its own as providing an additional 
mens rea option for the age element by creating a type of strict liability 
once the Government has shown the defendant had a reasonable 
opportunity to observe the minor. This result is achieved by reading the 
subsection as removing the government’s burden of proving the defendant’s 
knowledge or reckless disregard of the minor’s age.94 
Alternatively, subsection (c) could be read into subsection (a)(1) as a 
means of proving reckless disregard.95 Subsection (c) states that “the 
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not 
attained the age of 18 years” when the defendant had a reasonable 
opportunity to observe the minor.96 This subsection could be interpreted to 
allow the government to prove the lesser mens rea of reckless disregard by 
demonstrating that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe 
the minor. Obviously, a plain reading of the statute fails to produce clear 
results—a failing that is emphasized by the two courts that have addressed 
the interpretation of the statute.97 
In United States v. Wilson, an unpublished opinion denying a motion to 
dismiss the indictment, Judge Rosenbaum of the Southern District of 
Florida interpreted the plain language of subsection (c) to require the 
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant 
recklessly disregarded the person’s age and had a reasonable opportunity to 
observe the person.”98 The court ruled that the statute was not ambiguous, 
despite the government’s alternative reading of the statute.99 The 
government interpreted § 1591(c) to allow strict liability to satisfy the 
element of the victim’s status as a minor.100 This ruling was delivered 
without significant explanation.101 
                                                                                                                 
will be caused to engage in a commercial sexual act, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b). 
Id. 
 93. Compare United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 30-34 (2d Cir. 2012), with 
Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7. 
 94. See, e.g., Robinson, 702 F.3d at 32. 
 95. See, e.g., Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7. 
 96. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). 
 97. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 30-34; Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7. 
 98. 2010 WL 2991561, at *6 (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. 
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Conversely, the Second Circuit interpreted subsection (c) as creating an 
alternative mens rea to satisfy the age element.102 The court interpreted the 
statute as granting the government three mens rea options for proving the 
age element: (1) by showing the defendant knew the minor’s age, (2) by 
showing the defendant recklessly disregarded the minor’s age, or (3) by 
showing the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the 
minor.103 The court found that “the only interpretation [of § 1591(c)] that 
preserves any meaning, is that the provision creates strict liability where the 
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.”104 Notably, 
the court was aware of the interpretation by the Wilson court but maintained 
that the correct reading of the statute created a form of strict liability.105 
As evidenced by conflicting interpretations offered by these two courts, a 
plain reading of § 1591 does not provide a clear answer as to the meaning 
of its wording. When a plain reading of the statute is insufficient, courts 
may turn to legislative history to determine Congress’s intended 
meaning.106 
2. Legislative History of § 1591 
Because courts are directed to give effect to Congress’s intent,107 the 
legislative history of a statute may clarify Congress’s intended 
interpretation of the statute. The intended interpretation can be deduced 
from the congressional record, which includes transcripts of Senate or 
House of Representative hearings,108 and previous drafts of bills.109 
Legislative history often provides context to the language used in the 
statute.110 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 34. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 32. 
 105. See id. at 30. 
 106. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958) (“[A] thorough consideration of the 
relevant legislative history is required.”). 
 107. Id.; see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000). 
 108. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183 (1978) (utilizing a House of 
Representatives Conference Report in exercise of statutory interpretation). 
 109. See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854-56 (1984) (considering drafter’s 
comments in exercise of statutory interpretation); Hill, 437 U.S. at 183 (utilizing previous 
drafts of bills in exercise of statutory interpretation). 
 110. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 110-16 
(1980) (analyzing legislative history of a statute in order to determine its meaning). 
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Courts begin by looking at the stated purpose of the statute, typically 
found in the preamble.111 The purpose of the TVPRA is “to enhance 
measures to combat trafficking in persons,”112 and “to ensure just and 
effective punishment of traffickers.”113 Devoted to achieving that purpose, 
Congress amended § 1591 by adding “reckless disregard” as an alternative 
scienter in subsection (a), in addition to adding subsection (c).114 According 
to a congressional hearing, “reckless disregard” was deliberately added to 
“reach[] those who turn a willfully blind eye toward a person in commercial 
sexual activity who is being physically abused or is underage.”115 
Congressman Howard Berman also stated that case law inspired the 
addition of subsection (c),116 specifically citing United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc.117 and United States v. Jones.118 In X-Citement Video, the 
Supreme Court noted that the common-law presumption of mens rea was 
excused in statutes where the “perpetrator confronts the underage victim 
personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that victim’s 
age.”119 In Jones, the Fourth Circuit held that the government was not 
required to prove that the defendant knew the victim’s minor status in a 
prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which criminalizes the 
transportation of a minor across state lines for sexual purposes.120 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 117 (1990) (relying on the purpose 
as stated in the statute in exercise of statutory interpretation); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594, 602 n.7 (1981) (citing the preamble to show congressional awareness of an issue); 
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-90 (1981) (relying on purposes section of 
enacted statute in statutory interpretation). 
 112. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5044. 
 113. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a), 114 
Stat. 1464, 1466 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a)). Because the 2008 act reauthorized the 
TVPA, and there is no “purpose” section for the 2008 act, the author assumes that the 
Reauthorization Act of 2008 was written in light of the stated purpose and findings of the 
TVPA. 
 114. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
sec. 222(b)(5), § 1591(a), (c), 122 Stat. at 5069. 
 115. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard 
Berman). 
 116. Id. 
 117. 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
 118. 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 119. 513 U.S. at 72 n.2. 
 120. 471 F.3d at 538-39. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Jones is consistent with four 
other circuits. See United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scisum, 32 F.3d 1479, 1485-
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Delving into the previous versions of the bill reveals the development of 
subsection (c). Congressman Tom Lantos originally sponsored H.R. 3887, 
the initial bill seeking to reauthorize the TVPA, in 2007.121 In the proposal, 
he included an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 that replaced the phrase 
“that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and . . . will be caused 
to engage in a commercial sex act” with “that the person (being a person 
who has not attained the age of 18 years) will be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act” will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.122 In 
the same subsection, Congressman Lantos added, “In a prosecution under 
this subsection, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew 
that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”123 At that time, the 
proposal did not include a requirement that the defendant must have a 
reasonable opportunity to observe the minor.124 
From this proposal, it appears that Congressman Lantos intended for the 
age of the minor merely to be a fact the government had to prove, with no 
mens rea required on the part of the defendant.125 This viewpoint was 
advocated by Representative Carolyn Maloney during the committee 
hearing addressing this bill.126 She urged both the removal of proof of the 
defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s status as a minor for conviction 
under the then-current version of § 1591 and, alternatively, use of the 
victim’s status as a minor to increase punishment in the sentencing phase.127 
Relieving the government’s burden of proof as to the defendant’s 
knowledge of the victim’s minor status also supported the goal of reducing 
reliance on victim testimony, a commonly-expressed objective during the 
committee hearing.128 
H.R. 3887 died in the Senate in December 2007.129 Congressman Lantos 
succumbed to cancer in February 2008,130 and there was no activity to 
                                                                                                                 
86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972) (per 
curiam). 
 121. H.R. REP. NO. 110-430, at 84 (2007). 
 122. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 30 (statement 
of Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 95 (statement of Amy Farrell, Inst. on Race & Justice, Ne. Univ.). 
 129. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
home/LegislativeData.php (select “110” under “Select Congress”; then select 
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reauthorize the TVPA until December 2008.131 Congressman Berman 
proposed H.R. 7311, containing the amendment that reflects the current 
state of § 1591.132 Before the House of Representatives, Congressman 
Berman explained that H.R. 7311 drew from H.R. 3887, but “develop[ed] 
alternative proposals where the two bills diverge.”133 Congressman Berman 
also stated that the intentions behind the provisions were “closely 
aligned.”134 However, the resulting additions in H.R. 7311 of both the 
“reckless disregard” mens rea and subsection (c) reflected a significant 
divergence in congressional thought on mens rea.135 After receiving 
approval by unanimous consent in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate without amendment, President George W. Bush signed H.R. 
7311 into law on December 23, 2008.136 
The sponsors of H.R. 7311, obviously dissatisfied with the strict liability 
standard asserted in H.R. 3887, failed to indicate the source of the 
disagreement in the Congressional Record. Nevertheless, lobbyist materials 
may explain the shift in thought.137 Nine days after the hearing on H.R. 
3887 in 2007, the Department of Justice (DOJ) expressed its concerns about 
the bill to Committee on the Judiciary Chair Representative John Conyers, 
Jr.138 Specifically, the DOJ was concerned with the creation of a strict 
liability crime by removal of the mens rea requirement for the minor’s 
status.139 While similarities were drawn to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), a strict 
                                                                                                                 
“Word/Phrase” under “Enter Search”; then select “Include Variants (plurals, etc.)”; then 
search “3887”; then select “H.R. 3887”; then select “All Information”) (last visited June 5, 
2013). 
 130. David M. Herszenhorn, Tom Lantos, 80, Is Dead; Longtime Congressman, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/washington/12lantos.html. 
 131. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 7311, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
home/LegislativeData.php (select “110” under “Select Congress”; then select “Berman, 
Howard L. [D-CA-28]” under “Choose House Members”; then select “Word/Phrase” under 
“Enter Search” and search “wilberforce”; then select “H.R. 7311”; then select “All 
Information”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. 154 CONG. REC. H10903 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard 
Berman). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 7311, supra note 131. 
 136. Id. 
 137. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 131. 
 138. See Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 
9, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/dept-view-letter-hjc-on-hr3887.pdf. 
 139. Id. at 8. 
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liability crime for aggravated sexual abuse, the DOJ pointed to the 
affirmative defense available under § 2423.140 As written, H.R. 3887 
created “a substantial mandatory minimum sentence for a[] . . . strict 
liability crime.”141 The DOJ argued that the amendment to § 1591(a) “[ran] 
counter to the criminal law goal of punishing culpable states of mind.”142 In 
a separate publication, the DOJ suggested that an affirmative defense might 
alleviate some of its concerns.143 
While legislative history is commonly consulted in determining a 
statute’s meaning, some scholars suggest that current trends indicate the 
Supreme Court is reluctant to rely on statements made during a statute’s 
enactment.144 The Court may decline to find a statement made during the 
legislative process to be “an authoritative interpretation” of a statute.145 
Legislative history is often criticized because it is comprised of statements 
made by individuals when the goal of statutory interpretation is to 
determine the collective intent of Congress.146 Some scholars have even 
suggested that statements might be purposefully made to influence an 
interpretation of the statute that could not be achieved through the 
legislative process.147 As a result, the pursuit of a statute’s meaning rarely 
concludes with an analysis of the legislative history.148 However, legislative 
history remains a useful tool to understand the development of the language 
used in a particular statute.149 
  
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. at 9; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), (g) (2012) (permitting a reasonable mistake-
of-age defense). 
 141. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Facts about the Department of Justice’s Anti-Trafficking Efforts: July 2008, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/myths-and-facts.pdf (last visited June 6, 
2013). 
 144. CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 27 (2002); see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 117 (discussing 
critiques of relying on legislative history for statutory interpretation). 
 145. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 582 (1994). 
 146. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 124; see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 
290, 318 (1897) (collecting cases). 
 147. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 117. 
 148. Id. at 5 (“A number of judicial opinions use a combination of interpretative 
methods.”). 
 149. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (discussing the evolution 
of a statute in determining congressional intent). 
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3. Common Statutory Scheme—Similar Statutes 
Whenever possible, statutes should be interpreted to be consistent with 
existing statutes on the same subject matter.150 This canon of statutory 
construction proves especially true for statutes amended or drafted by the 
same session in Congress.151 Five federal statutes address criminal activity 
similar to that targeted in § 1591.152 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2241 criminalizes aggravated sexual abuse, defining 
the offense as “knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual 
act” through the use of force or threatening death, serious bodily injury or 
kidnapping.153 Section 2241(c) prescribes the increase in the mandatory 
minimum sentence based on the victim’s minority status.154 Using language 
similar to § 1591, the statute punishes more severely those who knowingly 
engage in the prohibited conduct in subsections (a) and (b) with “a person 
who has not attained the age of 12 years.”155 Notably, § 2241(d), 
substantially similar to § 1591(c), provides that “in a prosecution under 
subsection (c) of this section, the Government need not prove that the 
defendant knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act had not 
attained the age of 12 years.”156 Reading the plain language of § 2241 
indicates that the government must only prove the victim was less than 
twelve years old without the necessity of demonstrating that the defendant 
knew the victim’s age.157 Therefore, § 2241 essentially creates a strict 
liability crime if the victim is less than twelve years old. 
Section 2241 does not contain a provision allowing the alternative of 
proving the defendant acted with reckless disregard in committing the 
sexual act, as permitted in § 1591.158 Nevertheless, because the language in 
§ 1591(c) tracks so closely with § 2241(d), it may be assumed that 
Congress had a similar intent in mind—to create a strict liability crime as it 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1972) (describing the canon of 
statutory construction as “in pari materia”). 
 151. Id. at 244. 
 152. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251-2252, 2422-2423 (2012). 
 153. Id. § 2241(a). 
 154. Id. § 2241(c). 
 155. Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012). 
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 
 157. See id.; see also United States v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(including jury instructions requiring the government to prove that the minor had not 
attained the age of twelve years at the time of the offense without an element requiring the 
defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age). 
 158. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2241, with 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 
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relates to the commercial sexual exploitation of minors.159 In fact, Congress 
cited this statute directly when stating the reasoning behind drafting § 
1591.160 
The federal statute criminalizing the production of child pornography, 18 
U.S.C. § 2251, also creates strict liability regarding the element of the age 
of the victim.161 The Supreme Court noted that strict liability was 
appropriate, as the producers of child pornography “confront[] the underage 
victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that victim’s 
age.”162 The perpetrator carries the “risk of error” of misidentifying the 
victim’s age.163 
Perpetrators charged with an offense prohibited by § 1591 typically 
interact with the victim personally and, therefore, like under § 2251, can be 
reasonably required to determine the victim’s age.164 Because the 
underlying conduct of pandering is illegal,165 it may be even more 
appropriate that the sex trafficker carries the “risk of error,” similar to the 
child pornographer who misidentifies his victim’s age.166 
But the Supreme Court refused to apply strict liability to the mens rea of 
the victim’s minority status in prosecuting the transportation of child 
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252.167 After carefully analyzing the 
statutory language and the congressional history, the Court ruled that 
making § 2252 a strict liability crime would raise constitutional issues, 
specifically with the First Amendment.168 The mens rea in § 2252 
distinguished “legal innocence from wrongful conduct.”169 
However, the same constitutional issues do not arise with § 1591. 
Imposing strict liability for the mens rea for the age of the minor does not 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), with 18 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 
 160. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard 
Berman). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 2251; United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 76 n.5 
(1994).  
 162. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 72 n.2. 
 163. Id. at 76 n.5. 
 164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Persons involved with sex trafficking but who do not 
confront the victim personally are charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b). 
 165. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (West 2011). 
 166. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 76 n.5 (noting that producers of child 
pornography interact with victims and, therefore, can bear the “risk of error” in determining 
the performer’s age). 
 167. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 
 168. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 78. 
 169. Id. at 73. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/4
2013]       COMMENTS 683 
 
 
create the criminal conduct. The underlying conduct by the perpetrator—
causing a person to engage in a commercial sex act—would still be illegal, 
regardless of the victim’s age.170 
Coercing or enticing a minor to engage in prostitution or any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense is 
prohibited in 18 U.S.C. § 2422.171 Like 18 U.S.C. § 1591, it prohibits such 
conduct against an “individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.”172 
While the Supreme Court has not interpreted this statute, the Seventh 
Circuit applied the ruling from United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. to 
hold, in United States v. Coté, that in a prosecution under this statute the 
government must prove that the defendant knew the victim was under the 
age of eighteen years.173 The court avoided the potential constitutional 
issues discussed in X-Citement Video, where a scienter requirement 
distinguished legal conduct from wrongful conduct, by imposing a mens rea 
requirement on the age of the victim to avoid criminalizing legal conduct.174 
However, the requirement of mens rea of the victim’s age in § 1591 would 
not be necessary to distinguish legal conduct from wrongful conduct. 
Perhaps the most similar statute to § 1591 is 18 U.S.C. § 2423, which 
criminalizes the transportation of minors across state lines or in foreign 
commerce for the purpose of engaging in criminal sexual activity or illicit 
sexual conduct.175 Six circuit courts have addressed the interpretation of the 
mens rea of the age of the minor in this statute; all held that the government 
does not have to prove that the defendant knew that the victim was under 
the age of eighteen years.176 
                                                                                                                 
 170. If the perpetrator utilized force, fraud, or coercion to cause the victim to engage in a 
commercial sex act, and the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, the perpetrator can be 
prosecuted under § 1591(a). Most states also criminalize causing a person to engage in a 
commercial sex act. See Comprehensive State Human Trafficking Statutes, POLARIS PROJECT 
(July 2011), https://na4.salesforce.com/sfc/p/300000006E4SgF3edAeOtn_qXq9oDm1oHDo 
YM6c. 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 2422. 
 172. Id. § 2422(b). 
 173. United States v. Coté, 504 F.3d 682, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 174. See id. at 686.  
 175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423. 
 176. United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cox, 
577 F.3d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 350-51 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d 
Cir. 1972). 
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These rulings are diametrically opposed to the holding in Flores-
Figueroa v. United States.177 Addressing the interpretation of a statute 
criminalizing aggravated identity theft, the Supreme Court held in Flores-
Figueroa that the word “knowingly” applied to each element of the 
statute.178 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, addressing the interpretation of § 
2423 post-Flores-Figueroa, distinguished the case by focusing on the 
holding in X-Citement Video, on which the Court had relied in Flores-
Figueroa.179 
In X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court also held that the word 
“knowingly” applied to the age of the minor in the context of child 
pornography.180 However, the Supreme Court specifically noted, on more 
than one occasion in X-Citement Video, that the mens rea was necessary to 
distinguish legal conduct from wrongful conduct.181 The Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits distinguished Flores-Figueroa on that basis and held that § 2423 
merely increased the punishment based on the victim’s minor status for 
already wrongful conduct.182 The transportation of persons across state lines 
for the purpose of engaging in prostitution is prohibited in § 2421, which 
mirrors § 2423, but for the victim’s age language.183 In light of Congress’s 
intent to provide minors with “special protection against sexual 
exploitation,” the Seventh Circuit noted that it would be “implausible that 
Congress would want it to be harder to prove a violation of § 2423(a) than 
of § 2421.”184 
Justice Alito, concurring in Flores-Figueroa, emphasized that statutory 
interpretation should also consider context and that the majority’s holding 
should not be a rigid rule.185 He specifically referenced § 2423 as an 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009). 
 178. Id. at 652-55. 
 179. Id. at 652; Daniels, 653 F.3d at 410 (citing the discussion of United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), in Cox, 577 F.3d at 837); Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
 180. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 75. 
 181. Id. at 72 n.5, 73 & n.3. 
 182. Daniels, 653 F.3d at 410 (citing the discussion of X-Citement Video, Inc., in Cox, 
577 F.3d at 837); Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
 183. See Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 
2423. 
 184. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837 (citing United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 
2001)).  
 185. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 659-61 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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example where the context may implicate that “knowingly” does not apply 
to all elements of the offense.186 
In addition, Congress provided a safeguard in § 2423 to avoid any 
potential constitutional issues. Subsection (g) provides an affirmative 
defense for a defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
reasonably believed that the person was over the age of eighteen years.187 
However, this defense is not available for prosecutions under § 2423(a), 
which criminalizes transportation of any person with intent to engage in 
criminal sexual activity.188 This harkens back to the Supreme Court’s 
statement in X-Citement Video—that strict liability as it pertains to age is 
permissible in cases where the underlying conduct itself is illegal, 
regardless of the victim’s minority status. 
Congress passively approved this interpretation of § 2423.189 United 
States v. Jones was cited by Congress in the passage of § 1591, imposing 
strict liability on the defendant for the victim’s age.190 Jones held that the 
minor’s age was “a fact which the prosecution must prove and for which 
the defendant is responsible.”191 That holding is consistent with the four 
other circuit courts that have ruled on the issue.192 The Jones court noted 
that Congress amended § 2423 on nine different occasions since the circuit 
courts’ adoption of the strict liability interpretation yet never amended the 
statute to require the government to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the 
victim’s minor status.193 
Sections 1591 and 2423 share special connections both in legislative 
history and in prosecution. Section 2423, originally enacted in 1978,194 has 
become the statute used to punish those participating in child sex 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(g). 
 188. Id. § 2423(a).  
 189. See 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard 
Berman). 
 190. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 191. Jones, 471 F.3d at 538. 
 192. Id. at 538-39 (citing United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scisum, 32 F.3d 
1479, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 
1972)). 
 193. Id. at 539. 
 194. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
225, sec. 3(a), § 2423, 92 Stat. 7, 8 (1978). 
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tourism.195 Child sex tourism occurs when a person travels with the intent to 
engage in any illicit sexual activity with a child in another country.196 Sex 
trafficking of minors and child sex tourism are two closely related crimes, 
which have been addressed by Congress in conjunction with each other.197 
In its efforts to prosecute sex traffickers, the DOJ utilizes § 2423 in addition 
to § 1591.198 Accordingly, § 2423 remains the most closely-related statute 
to § 1591, both in intent and construction.199 For these reasons, the 
construction and application of § 2423 should inform the interpretation of § 
1591. 
A review of the statutory background against which Congress legislated 
demonstrates Congress’s intent to protect children from sexual exploitation 
through the specific designs of these statutes.200 Still, that goal must be 
balanced by avoiding the criminalization of legal conduct.201 In light of the 
statutory context, Congress most likely drafted § 1591(c) to allow for strict 
liability as it applies to the victim’s minority status in an effort to ease the 
burden on prosecuting sex traffickers. Causing a person to engage in a 
commercial sex act is already criminal conduct; the minority status simply 
increases the punishment.202 However, courts are tasked with interpreting 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, sec. 105, § 2423(b)-(g), 117 Stat. 650, 653-54 (amending 
18 U.S.C. § 2423 to include punishment for those participating in child sex tourism). 
 196. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012). 
 197. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
sec. 204, 208, §§ 2423(a), 1591(b), 120 Stat. 587, 613, 615. 
 198. See Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice 
.gov/crt/about/crm/htpu.php#tra (last visited June 9, 2013). 
 199. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, sec. 204, 208, §§ 
2423(a), 1591(b), 120 Stat. at 613, 615. 
 200. United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
105-557, at 17 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 686). 
 201. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994). 
 202. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2012), with id.  § 2422. All states and the District 
of Columbia have anti-pimping laws.  ALA. CODE § 13A-12-111 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 
11.66.110 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3209 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-101 
(1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-203 (2011); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-85 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1352 (1953); D.C. Code § 22-2705 
(2013); FLA. STAT. § 796.05 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-11 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
712-1202 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5606 (1994); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14.3 
(2011); IND. CODE § 35-45-4-4 (1976); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
6420 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.040 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:83.1 
(1984); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A § 853 (1975); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-304 (2013); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 7 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.455 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 
609.322 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §97-29-51 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 567.050 (1977); 
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the statute as written and should not judicially amend the statute in an effort 
to align the statute more clearly with congressional intent.203 
4. Avoiding Constitutional Issues 
In deference to Congress and the presumption that Congress legislates 
within the bounds of the Constitution, courts interpret statutes to avoid 
constitutional issues.204 Interpreting § 1591(c) to create strict liability as to 
the age of the victim may violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment.205 Such an 
argument has already been advanced, although it was not considered due to 
ripeness concerns.206 A person convicted under § 1591(a)(1) faces a 
minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment to a maximum sentence of 
life in prison.207 If the minor involved was under the age of fourteen years, 
the defendant faces imprisonment for a minimum of fifteen years to a 
maximum sentence of life.208 
These mandatory minimum sentences were established in 2006.209 
Before 2006, a conviction under § 1591(a)(1) did not have a mandatory 
                                                                                                                 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-602 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-802 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
201.300 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1 (West 
2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-4 (1981); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.32 (McKinney 2013); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-204 (1919); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-29-01 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2907.22 (LexisNexis 2011); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1081 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 
167.012 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-34.1-7 (2009); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-15-100 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-23-2 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
39-13-515 (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.03 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1305 (LexisNexis 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2637 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-357 
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.070 (2012); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-5 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 
944.33 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-103 (2013). 
 203. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68-69 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to 
provide for what we might think, perhaps along with some Members of Congress, is the 
preferred result.”). 
 204. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988) (collecting cases). 
 205. United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. 
July 27, 2010). 
 206. Id. (declining to address the Eighth Amendment issue because the defendant had not 
been sentenced and, thus, the issue was not ripe for review). 
 207. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2). 
 208. Id. § 1591(b)(1). 
 209. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
sec. 208, § 1591(b), 120 Stat. 587, 615. 
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minimum sentence.210 If the victim was between the ages of fourteen years 
and eighteen years, the maximum sentence was forty years 
imprisonment.211 Without specifically raising a potential constitutionality 
issue, the DOJ expressed concerns regarding the “substantial mandatory 
minimum sentence for an already unusual strict liability crime.”212 
While it may seem that the penalties are harsh for a strict liability crime, 
especially the mandatory minimum sentences, it is unlikely that a court will 
rule the statute unconstitutional based on cruel and unusual punishment 
grounds.213 To be unconstitutional on these grounds, the punishment must 
be “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”214 In light of 
courts’ deference to Congress in setting punishment terms, courts rarely 
find a non-capital sentence grossly disproportionate to the related 
offense.215 The likelihood that a ten- or fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence will be determined to be cruel and unusual is unlikely, even if the 
sentence is imposed under a strict liability standard.216 
The constitutionality of the sentencing provisions in § 1591 still has not 
been challenged.217 But a sentence of thirty years for aggravated sexual 
abuse of a minor, under 18 U.S.C. § 2241, survived a constitutional 
challenge for cruel and unusual punishment despite the strict liability 
standard for the victim’s minor status.218 The Supreme Court has hinted that 
a life without the possibility of parole sentence might fall to an Eighth 
                                                                                                                 
 210. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (Supp. IIII 2003) (amended 2006). 
 211. Id. § 1591(b)(2). 
 212. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8. 
 213. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of capital 
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been 
exceedingly rare.”). 
 214. Id. at 271. 
 215. United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-99 (1991)). The Supreme Court upheld a mandatory life 
sentence for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, imposed based on a recidivist statute. 
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266, 285. Contra Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281, 283-84, 303 
(1983) (affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision overturning a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole for a check fraud offense, and distinguishing Rummel on the fact that the 
sentence in Rummel had the possibility of parole). 
 216. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. 
 217. Except, of course, in United States v. Wilson. No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, 
at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2010). In that opinion, addressing several pre-trial motions, the 
court declined to address the cruel and unusual punishment challenge, stating that the 
defendant lacked standing as he had not been convicted and sentenced. Id. 
 218. Farley, 607 F.3d at 1342. 
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Amendment challenge.219 Because § 1591 does not allow for that penalty, 
and due to the deference shown to the legislature in determining minimum 
and maximum prison terms, a constitutional challenge rooted in the Eighth 
Amendment would likely fail to prevent a court from applying strict 
liability to the minor’s age in a prosecution under § 1591. 
B. The Role of “Reasonable Opportunity to Observe” 
Regardless of which alternative interpretation of § 1591(c) the court 
adopts, it must also define “reasonable opportunity to observe.”220 A 
number of questions must be answered, including what circumstances 
establish a “reasonable opportunity to observe.” The court must also 
consider whether to instruct the jury to focus on either the reasonableness of 
the opportunity to observe the minor or the reasonableness of the 
conclusions drawn from the opportunity to observe the minor. 
Addressing each in turn, no definitive answers exist. Neither case law 
nor legislative history provides any concrete guidance as to the appropriate 
definition of “reasonable opportunity to observe.” A common theme 
emerges, however, based on duration of the observation and the context of 
the observation. 
While no court has defined “reasonable opportunity to observe,” two 
cases may shed light on what satisfies a “reasonable opportunity to 
observe.”221 In the only published opinion applying § 1591(c), the jury in 
United States v. Robinson found by special verdict that the defendant had a 
reasonable opportunity to observe the victim and, therefore, to determine 
her status as a minor.222 In that case, the defendant recruited a seventeen-
year-old victim to engage in prostitution.223 The victim testified that the 
defendant was her “boyfriend” and “lover” whom she had dated for two-
                                                                                                                 
 219. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023, 2034 (2010) (“The Constitution 
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not 
commit homicide.”). 
 220. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2012).  
 221. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 27-29 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Paris, No. 03:06-CR-64(CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *9 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 2007). 
 222. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 29; see also Special Verdict Form, Robinson, No. 09-CR-794 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010). Because the opinion in Wilson was a ruling on a pre-trial motion 
for summary judgment, the court did not apply § 1591(c) to the facts of the case. See Wilson, 
2010 WL 2991561. 
 223. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27-29; Brief for United States at 15-17, Robinson, 702 F.3d 
22 (No. 11-0301), 2011 WL 3437848, at *26-28. 
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and-a-half years.224 The jury found these facts sufficient to satisfy 
“reasonable opportunity to observe.”225 
In a case charged under the 2000 version of § 1591,226 the jury found that 
the defendant consciously avoided knowing the victim’s age based on 
evidence that the defendant had seen the minor’s naked body when she was 
fourteen years of age, had sex with her at that age, and knew that she had 
“young friends who were still in high school.”227 The defendant caused the 
victim to engage in commercial sex acts for approximately one-and-a-half 
years.228 In both this case and Robinson, the defendants had opportunities to 
observe the minors for at least one year and had sexual relations with the 
minors.229 
Significantly shorter durations of observation have likewise been found 
to establish “reasonable opportunit[ies] to observe,” albeit in different 
contexts.230 During a bank robbery, twenty minutes sufficed for a witness to 
have a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the defendant for identification 
purposes, despite the witness’s distress at the time of observation.231 In 
another case, the defendant kidnapped a young girl and her brother when 
they were walking home from school with friends.232 After raping the girl 
twice, the defendant left the girl and her brother in a field where they were 
rescued by the police later that day.233 The police apprehended the 
defendant the following day and he was identified by the girl and her 
brother, as well as by friends who were present when the abduction 
                                                                                                                 
 224. Transcript of Trial, United States v. Robinson, No. 09-CR-794 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 
2010). 
 225. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 29. 
 226. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2000) (amended 2008) (requiring proof that the defendant knew 
the victim’s age). 
 227. United States v. Paris, No. 3:06-CR-64(CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *9 (D. Conn. 
Oct. 24, 2007) (discussing the charges resulting from victim Marianne C.). 
 228. Id. at *2. 
 229. Robinson, 2012 WL 5971545, at *8-9; Paris, 2007 WL 3124724, at *2. 
 230. E.g., United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1972) (discussing “ample 
opportunity” to observe the defendant during bank robbery); United States v. Hinkle, 448 
F.2d 1157, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (observing the defendant for three to four minutes in good 
lighting at less than eight feet away sufficed for identification purposes). 
 231. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
 232. Reynold v. Lockhart, 470 F.2d 161, 162 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
 233. Id. 
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occurred.234 The Eighth Circuit noted that “the nature of the crime itself” 
allowed the victims the opportunity to observe the defendant.235 
The common theme of confronting the person in close proximity for 
some period of time emerges. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
statements, in dicta, that a producer of child pornography “confronts the 
underage victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that 
victim’s age.”236 Therefore, “reasonable opportunity to observe” may 
simply require confronting the victim personally for some reasonable 
amount of time. When a defendant has observed a victim over a significant 
period of time and had sexual relations with her, it may be easier to 
establish that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe.237 
However, where the minor victim is close to the age of eighteen years and 
possibly more physically developed, it may become more challenging to 
satisfy “reasonable opportunity to observe.” The definition of “reasonable” 
becomes pertinent. 
In difficult cases, determining whether the defendant had a reasonable 
opportunity to observe the minor may turn on whether the focus is on the 
reasonableness of the opportunity or the reasonableness of the conclusions 
drawn from the observation of the minor.238 For example, the defendant 
may have a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim at length, but his 
observations may reasonably lead him to believe that the victim is at least 
eighteen years of age. Observing the victim purchase cigarettes or alcohol 
or the victim’s physical appearance may lead the reasonable person to 
conclude that the victim is over the age of eighteen years. 
Denial of the admission of this type of evidence (demonstrating that lay 
witnesses reasonably concluded the victim was at least the age of consent) 
was held to be reversible error in a conviction of sexual abuse of a minor.239 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Oliver v. Pennsylvania, 321 F. Supp. 192, 194 
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (stating that a rape victim “had sufficient opportunity to observe each of 
them” after observing the defendants for two hours). 
 236. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2 (1994); see also 154 
CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman) (citing 
X-Citement Video, Inc., as motivating the addition of subsection (c) to 18 U.S.C. § 1591). 
 237. Domestic Sex Trafficking: Criminal Operations of the American Pimp, supra note 
67. Because many sex traffickers groom their victims by raping them, this fact pattern may 
be common. Id. 
 238. Without statutory or judicial guidance, the jury will have to determine whether the 
length of time was reasonable to determine the age of the victim or, alternatively, whether 
the observations would reasonably lead the defendant to believe the victim was a minor. 
 239. United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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The court stated that the lay witnesses’ conclusions that the victim was at 
least the age of consent based on observations of the victim smoking, of the 
victim driving a vehicle, and of the victim’s physical appearance would 
have been helpful to the jury in understanding a fact at issue, namely the 
defendant’s reasonable-mistake-of-age defense.240 In that case, the mere 
opportunity to observe may not have put the defendant on sufficient notice 
that the person was less than eighteen years of age. Establishing 
“reasonable opportunity to observe” may depend on demonstrating that the 
defendant observed indicators that reasonably led him to believe the victim 
was a minor. 
Ultimately, the definition of “reasonable opportunity to observe” may 
simply be a question left for the jury to decide based on the judge’s 
instructions.241 Jurors may draw inferences as to whether the defendant had 
the opportunity to reasonably observe the minor based on their own 
observations of the minor during trial or through other evidence, such as 
photographs of the minor from the time period when first recruited.242 
III. Repercussions Resulting from the Ambiguity of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1591, among other statutes, to empower 
federal prosecutors and agencies to effectively punish sex traffickers.243 
However, empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrates prosecutors may 
elect to prosecute sex traffickers under different laws.244 For example, a 
representative of the Human Trafficking Task Force in Washington, D.C., 
testified that the majority of the prosecutions the task force has conducted 
have been under local or state laws because prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at 1254-56. 
 241. See, e.g., United States v. Del Toro, 426 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1970) (“It is the 
function of the jury to determine the facts and thereby the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant.”); Transcript of Trial at 350, United States v. Robinson, No. 09-CR-794 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010). 
 242. See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that in a 
case alleging the receipt and possession of child pornography, jurors can rely on common 
sense to determine whether children in photographs were real as opposed to virtual). 
 243. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 Stat. 
1464, 1466. 
 244. Peters, supra note 61, at 87; Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 278; e.g., Brooke 
Grona-Robb, Prosecuting Human Traffickers, TEX. DIST. & CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, http:// 
www.tdcaa.com/node/7370 (last visited June 9, 2013). 
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1591 are too resource-intensive and run a higher risk of re-traumatizing the 
victim when compared to prosecutions under local laws.245 
Prosecuting under state laws will hinder the other TVPA goals of 
prevention and protection. Not only is sex trafficking a nationwide 
problem,246 states often lack the necessary resources to effectively prosecute 
sex trafficking enterprises that can span states and nations.247 Victims may 
lose access to federally funded victim services if their cases are not tried 
under a federal trafficking statute.248 Prevention efforts are not met because 
local statutes often have significantly lighter prison sentences.249 In 
addition, the effectiveness of the federal statute can impact state 
prosecutions as states often model their prosecutions of sex trafficking 
crimes after federal programs. Without effective federal prosecution under 
§ 1591, Congress’s goal of eradicating the second-largest criminal industry 
in the world will not be realized.250 
A. Consequences of Ineffective Prosecution on the Goal of Protecting Sex 
Trafficking Victims 
Prosecuting under state laws often results in inadequate protection for the 
victim. Since its inception, the TVPA has provided coordinated social 
services to victims, as well as immigration services, if needed, that cannot 
be duplicated by the states.251 In order to access these services and 
protections, victims must be recognized as sex trafficking victims.252 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 43 (statement 
of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project). 
 246. See, e.g., Annual Report—2010: National Human Trafficking Resource Center 
(NHTRC), POLARIS PROJECT 19 (2011), available at https://na4.salesforce.com/sfc/p/ 
300000006E4Si WNbb7yid8slHcffD3847fcBJts= (detailing hotline calls from victims from 
states across the nation). 
 247. Accord 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(24) (2012) (describing the need for federal legislation 
to attack the problem of human trafficking from the states to worldwide). 
 248. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464; 18 
U.S.C. § 1593 (2012); see also Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 278-79 (discussing the 
ramifications of charging sex traffickers under non-trafficking statutes). 
 249. The local D.C. statute has a statutory maximum of twenty years for pandering of a 
minor, with no mandatory minimum, which is significantly less than the mandatory 
minimum of ten or fifteen years, depending on the age of the minor, to a maximum of life 
imprisonment under the federal statute. Compare D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010), with 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)-(2). 
 250. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8. 
 251. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, § 107, 114 Stat. at 1474-80. 
 252. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b). 
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Oftentimes, victims of trafficking are identified only after being arrested 
for prostitution.253 Child victims of sex trafficking may spend a significant 
amount of time in juvenile detention before being identified as trafficking 
victims.254 Once released from detention, these victims need food, shelter, 
psychological care, and legal services.255 Child victims are often placed in 
foster care, but they need special attention, including health care and 
counseling.256 Depending on how long individuals are held by their 
traffickers, they may also need educational or vocational training.257 
Without these services, the victims may be more vulnerable to being re-
trafficked.258 Through the TVPA, a trafficking victim may be eligible for 
these types of services.259 
In order for an immigrant child to receive social services, a requestor, 
typically an investigator, must submit a form to the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement.260 This requires, first, that the investigator recognize the child 
as a victim of trafficking and, second, that the investigator be aware of the 
social services available through the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services as provided by the TVPA.261 
In addition, prosecution and conviction under the federal sex trafficking 
statute result in mandatory restitution to be paid to the victim or her 
guardian.262 If necessary, an identified victim of sex trafficking may be 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Linda A. Smith et al., The National Report on Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking: 
America’s Prostituted Children, SHARED HOPE INT’L 52 (2009), available at http://shared 
hope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/SHI_National_Report_on_DMST_2009.pdf. 
 254. Id. at 54. 
 255. See Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 41. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Job Training, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-
do/client-services/our-services/job-training-program (last visited June 10, 2013) (describing 
job training programs available for human trafficking victims). 
 258. See Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 76 (statement 
of Dorchen A. Leidholt, Director, Sanctuary for Families’ Ctr. for Battered Women’s Legal 
Servs.). 
 259. 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012). In order to be eligible for these benefits, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services must certify that the victim meets certain requirements, 
including that she assists in the investigation. Id. § 7105(b)(1)(E). 
 260. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Request for Assistance for Child Victims of 
Human Trafficking (OMB No. 0970-0362, n.d.), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/orr/request_for_assistance_for_child_victims_of_human_trafficking.pdf. 
 261. Id. (instructing investigators regarding law enforcement providing assistance). 
 262. 18 U.S.C. § 1593. 
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eligible for federal witness protection.263 Without prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. § 1591, the victim may not be eligible for these benefits.264 
While prosecution itself is not necessary for a victim to be eligible for 
social services under the TVPA, official acknowledgement of her as a 
trafficking victim is required.265 Because acknowledgement as a trafficking 
victim first requires that the law enforcement agent or prosecutor recognize 
the victim as such, awareness of the crime of sex trafficking and how to 
identify sex trafficking victims is necessary.266 This awareness comes from 
proper training and the application of that training to effective 
prosecutions.267 Without training and prosecution experience, victims will 
not be recognized as trafficking victims because investigators and 
prosecutors will fail to identify the signs that a child has been trafficked 
into the commercial sex industry.268 Furthermore, if the child is not 
recognized as a trafficking victim, she may face prosecution for 
prostitution269 and may be more likely to be re-trafficked without the 
resources to keep her safe.270 
  
                                                                                                                 
 263. Id. § 1594. 
 264. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b). While prosecution is not required, prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. § 1591 means the prosecutor identified the victim as a sex trafficking victim, which 
will make her eligible for these services. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Furthermore, if the person is 
identified as a victim of another type of crime (for example, pandering), she may not be 
eligible for these services limited to sex trafficking victims. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b). 
 265. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b). 
 266. See HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., ICF INT’L, PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
CASES: LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES 24 (Jun. 30, 2008), available at 
https:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223972.pdf. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See, e.g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.02 (West 2011). 
 270. See Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 102-03 
(emphasizing the importance of safe shelter for victims to avoid being re-trafficked); see 
also HEATHER J. CLAWSON & LISA GOLDBLATT GRACE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., FINDING A PATH TO RECOVERY: RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR MINOR VICTIMS OF 
DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING (n.d.), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/HumanTraffick 
ing/ResFac/ib.pdf (discussing safety issues arising from traffickers stalking shelters where 
victims are staying). In addition, victims may develop a strong attachment to the trafficker as 
“one form of the Stockholm Syndrome—an extreme form of [Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder] otherwise most frequently seen in torture victims”—which may lead a victim to 
return to her trafficker. Id. 
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B. Consequences of Ineffective Prosecution on the Goal of Preventing Sex 
Trafficking 
As the second-fastest growing criminal enterprise in the world,271 sex 
trafficking is driven by the economic principles of supply and demand.272 In 
order to prevent sex trafficking, the economic benefits that appeal to 
criminals must be reduced by increasing the costs and risks imposed by 
participating in this crime.273 Strong and definite punishment imposes a 
significant risk on the industry.274 Lengthy prison sentences are designed to 
deter criminals from re-entering the criminal world.275 As a result, Congress 
established significant prison terms for sex traffickers, ranging from a 
minimum of ten years to life imprisonment.276 
Difficulties and uncertainties of federal prosecution of sex trafficking 
lead to the referral of cases for prosecution to the state level.277 However, 
because most state prison sentences are significantly shorter than those in 
the federal system, the deterrent effect is minimized.278 State sentences for 
human trafficking violations can be as short as five years.279 The states that 
do not have human trafficking statutes prosecute under anti-pimping or 
pandering laws.280 These laws can impose a punishment as small as one-
year imprisonment that can be waived in lieu of probation.281 Moreover, 
federal punishment is often a more significant deterrent than state-level 
                                                                                                                 
 271. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8. 
 272. See Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 266-68 (discussing “[t]he Business of Sex 
Trafficking”). 
 273. For a discussion of economic principles applied to the sex trafficking market, see id. 
 274. One purpose of punishment is to deter criminals from participating in or repeating 
criminal activity. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 26-27 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing 
theories of punishment); see also Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 277 (stating that 
traffickers will move to jurisdictions that have more lenient human trafficking statutes). 
 275. See LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 27 (stating that punishment should be an 
“unpleasant experience” that will deter the criminal from participating in future criminal 
activity). 
 276. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) (2012). 
 277. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 43 (statement 
of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project) (discussing use of local 
statutes to prosecute sex traffickers in order to avoid burdensome federal prosecutions). 
 278. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010) (no mandatory minimum sentence); see 
also LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 29. 
 279. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1(c) (West 2012). 
 280. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 176A.100, 201.300 (West 2011). 
 281. See, e.g., id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/4
2013]       COMMENTS 697 
 
 
punishment because parole does not exist in the federal system,282 whereas 
state prison systems result in shorter actual imprisonment due to the parole 
system.283 
In the event that federal prosecution is pursued, prosecutors may be able 
to prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 2423, as opposed to § 1591, but only if the 
trafficker actually transported the victim across state lines.284 Because 
prosecutors are given wide deference to determine what charges to bring, a 
prosecutor will likely choose to indict under a statute with which he is more 
familiar.285 If a prosecutor successfully convicts under § 2423, the sex 
trafficker will receive a significantly lighter sentence than if the trafficker 
had been convicted under § 1591.286 Under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, a defendant with no criminal history who is convicted under § 
2423 will receive a sentence of at least 120 months.287 The same defendant 
convicted under § 1591 would receive a sentence of at least 180 months.288 
Electing to prosecute under § 2423 decreases the defendant’s sentence by at 
least sixty months.289 Congress recognized the need for harsh punishment of 
                                                                                                                 
 282. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 214(b), 98 Stat. 1987, 
2014 (abolishing parole in the federal system through the repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 5041). 
 283. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.432-209.451 (West 2011); Memorandum 
from Rex Reed, Adm’r, Offender Mgmt. Div. of Dep’t of Corr. to Departmental Staff (Jan. 
3, 2008), available at http://www.doc.nv.gov/?q=node/80 (discussing how inmates can 
decrease the amount of time spent in prison through good behavior and work credit through 
the Nevada parole system). 
 284. Section 2423 criminalizes the transportation of minors across state lines for the 
purpose of engaging in criminal sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012). If the sex 
trafficker crosses state lines, § 2423 will also apply. See id. Prosecutors may choose to bring 
charges under both § 1591 and § 2423. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 
1191 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 285. Peters, supra note 61, at 87. 
 286. The minimum mandatory punishment for a defendant convicted under § 2423(a) is 
ten years, compared to fifteen years under § 1591(b). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), with 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(b). In addition, the federal sentencing guidelines establish the base offense 
level for a conviction under § 2423 as twenty-eight, compared to thirty-four for a conviction 
under § 1591, which may lead to a substantially lower sentence. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.3 (2012). 
 287. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); see also infra note 289. 
 288. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). 
 289. Compare id., with id. § 2423(a). The difference is calculated by comparing the 
minimum required sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (120 months) to the 
minimum required sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (180 months), with the 
assumption that the defendant does not have a criminal history and the judge sentences to the 
minimum possible terms. Notably, the difference in punishment is not only limited to the 
length of the prison term. The difference in base levels also impacts the amount of 
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sex traffickers when it increased the mandatory penalty to a minimum of 
180 months’ imprisonment.290 However, by prosecuting under § 2423, that 
need is not realized. 
For these reasons, there must be an effective federal statute to secure 
prosecution of sex traffickers. Federal prosecution has a greater impact on 
reducing the supply in the sex trafficking industry by imposing more 
significant risks on traffickers through significant prison terms.291 The 
essential goal of preventing sex trafficking is better served and more likely 
achieved through federal prosecution. 
C. Consequences of Ineffective Federal Prosecution on State Anti-Human 
Trafficking Programs 
The effectiveness of state human trafficking statutes is affected by the 
nature of the federal statute for two reasons. First, many states with human 
trafficking statutes modeled their statutes after the Model State Anti-
Trafficking Criminal Statute (Model Law), created by the DOJ.292 The 
Senate encouraged states to use this Model Law when creating their own 
anti-trafficking statutes.293 The Model Law mirrors the federal statute, 
thereby embodying the inherent ambiguity and resulting consequences.294 
Because 92% of human trafficking investigations occur at the state level,295 
any challenges presented by the federal statute are likely to also occur in 
federally inspired state statutes. 
Second, the structure of federal programs often provides guidelines for 
states implementing similar programs.296 Because programs supporting 
trafficking victims and prosecuting the traffickers were first identified and 
                                                                                                                 
permissible fines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(c)(3) (comparing the 
fine range of $12,500 to $125,000 for base level twenty-eight with the fine range of $17,500 
to $175,000 for base level thirty-four). 
 290. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
sec. 208, § 1591, 120 Stat. 587, 615. 
 291. Because “[t]he magnitude of the threatened punishment is clearly a factor” in 
determining a punishment’s deterring effect, the risks imposed on the trafficker are greater. 
See LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 29. 
 292. MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE (2004), available at http:// 
www.legislationline.org/documents/id/6805. 
 293. S. RES. 414, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 294. Compare MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE, with 18 U.S.C. § 
1591 (2012). 
 295. DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS 
OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 2008-2010, at 4 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http:// bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cshti0810.pdf. 
 296. See, e.g., MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE. 
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developed at the federal level, some state programs are modeled after the 
federal programs.297 Unfortunately, the federal program is underdeveloped 
as some prosecutors are electing to prosecute under local laws.298 If the 
federal program is undeveloped then states do not have the necessary 
guidance to develop better programs. The DOJ recently increased its 
training for federal prosecutors and agencies, and similar training is also 
made available to state agencies.299 If prosecutors do not use the federal sex 
trafficking of a minor statute, the training becomes useless.300 Because most 
cases are investigated at the state level,301 any expertise developed in the 
federal program is not utilized to prosecute sex traffickers.302 
Due to the underdevelopment of these programs, 68% of state and local 
prosecutors indicated that human trafficking was not an issue in their 
jurisdictions.303 The study noted, however, that a lack of knowledge and 
awareness of human trafficking issues may explain why those prosecutors 
believed human trafficking did not occur in their jurisdictions.304 As a 
result, the programs designed to protect human trafficking victims, prevent 
the occurrence of human trafficking, and prosecute the perpetrators are 
ineffective. Congress must set the example through a well-designed statute 
and fully supporting programs. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is subject to 
alternative interpretations,305 Congress should amend the statute to clearly 
identify the intended mens rea of the victim’s status as a minor in order to 
                                                                                                                 
 297. See Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 41 (statement 
of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project); see also SHARED HOPE INT’L, 
supra note 70, at 117-219 (discussing each state’s law and identifying those that are 
comparable to federal legislation). Training opportunities may be increasing. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND ASSESSMENT OF U.S. 
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 63 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/annualreports/tr2009/agreporthuman 
trafficking2009.pdf. 
 298. Peters, supra note 61, at 87; Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 278. 
 299. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 297, at 63. 
 300. Training will not yield more effective prosecutions if there are no prosecutions in 
the first place. Moreover, any skills learned will not be practiced. Therefore, training is 
wasted. 
 301. BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 295, at 4. 
 302. Compare id., with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 297, at 63. 
 303. CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at 23. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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achieve the stated goals of the TVPA: prevention, protection and 
prosecution.306 
IV. Determining the Most Effective Mens Rea Standard 
The two courts that have addressed the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1591 construed the mens rea of the age of the victim as two conflicting 
concepts: one adopting the strict liability approach,307 the other holding that 
§ 1591(c) merely provides a method to prove the mens rea for the age of the 
victim.308 The question then remains of whether the defendant should be 
held liable for the victim’s age, regardless of the defendant’s knowledge or 
lack thereof. While many public interest groups promote the adoption of 
strict liability,309 others express concern about the implications of imposing 
strict liability for a felony carrying such a severe penalty.310 
A. Justifications for the Adoption of a Strict Liability Standard 
Due to the heinous nature of the crime of sex trafficking of minors, 
public policy cries out for strict liability.311 In fact, the 2008 amendment to 
the TVPA proposed by Congressman Chris Smith, called for strict 
liability.312 Congressman Smith was concerned with the prevalence of 
forced prostitution and wanted to take all steps to eradicate the practice.313 
However, others involved in the drafting of anti-trafficking legislation were 
                                                                                                                 
 306. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 
Stat. 1464, 1466. 
 307. United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d. 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 308. United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7-8 (S.D. Fla. 
July 27, 2010). 
 309. See, e.g., Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human 
Trafficking: Commentary, POLARIS PROJECT 11, available at http://www.polarisproject.org/ 
storage/documents/policy_documents/cml%20commentary%20edition%203%20final%20w
out%20links.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013); CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, NAT’L INST. 
ON STATE POLICY ON TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS, RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE 
LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS 3 (2005), available 
at http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/pdfs/TraffickingResourceGuide.pdf [hereinafter 
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-
TRAFFICKING LAWS] (proposing statutory language that lacks a mens rea requirement for the 
victim’s age). 
 310. See, e.g., Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 
8. 
 311. Infra IV.A.4. (discussing various public policy groups advocating for strict 
liability). 
 312. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, supra note 129. 
 313. Peters, supra note 61, at 45-47. 
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concerned that Congressman Smith’s focus on sex trafficking ignored labor 
trafficking.314 A series of compromises and revisions resulted in the 
ambiguous language that was ultimately passed.315 
Several arguments support an adoption of the strict liability standard, 
originally advocated for by Congressman Smith, in order to effectively 
prosecute sex traffickers and eradicate the practice of human trafficking. 
First, applying strict liability to the crime of sex trafficking would not be a 
radical change from well-established crimes, such as statutory rape. Second, 
the imposition of strict liability does not result in criminalizing otherwise 
legal conduct. Third, congressional intent appears to support the strict 
liability standard. Finally, most public interest groups and nongovernmental 
organizations that work with trafficking victims support the adoption of the 
strict liability standard. 
1. Similar Strict Liability Sex Crime: Statutory Rape316 
The TVPA did not necessarily create new crimes, but rather adapted pre-
established crimes to be more effective at fighting human trafficking.317 
Before 2000, sex trafficking was punished through statutes criminalizing 
actions such as kidnapping or extortion.318 Even today, defendants are often 
charged with other crimes in addition to sex trafficking, such as prostitution 
or drug trafficking.319 The principles behind these pre-established crimes 
should be considered when determining what the mens rea requirement 
should be in sex trafficking of minors laws.320 
At its core, sex trafficking of a minor is sexual assault.321 Whether the 
trafficker actually commits the sexual assault or causes the sexual assault 
through the solicitation of clients, the heart of the crime is “sexual 
intercourse [or sexual contact] with another person who does not 
                                                                                                                 
 314. Id. at 47-50. 
 315. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, supra note 129. 
 316. The TVPA recognized that sex trafficking incorporates the elements of other crimes, 
such as forcible rape, kidnapping, and fraud. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(9)-(10) (2012). Congress 
noted that those laws were inadequate to eliminate human trafficking. Id. § 7101(b)(14)-
(15). Consequently, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to provide appropriate punishment 
for sex traffickers. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b). 
 317. Peters, supra note 61, at 59-61. 
 318. Id. 
 319. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 77-78. 
 320. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952) (considering common law 
treatment of crime in order to determine mens rea of statute). 
 321. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3), with Sexual Assault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
131 (9th ed. 2009). 
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consent.”322 Every state imposes criminal liability for sexual intercourse or 
sexual contact with a minor under an identified age, commonly called 
statutory rape.323 Most states make statutory rape a strict liability offense.324 
Very few states require any mens rea or “consciousness of wrongdoing.”325 
The imposition of strict liability for sexual intercourse or contact with a 
minor rests on two principles: (1) regardless of the minor’s voluntary 
participation in the act, the minor lacks capacity to consent due to age, and 
(2) the state has an interest in enforcing morality and protecting its minor 
citizens.326 
Similar principles apply to the crime of sex trafficking of a minor. The 
federal government maintains sincere interests in enforcing sex trafficking 
laws to protect children from abuse and in protecting its citizens from 
crime.327 First, similar to statutory rape laws, children lack the capacity to 
consent to commercial sex acts and should be protected from engaging in 
commercial sex acts “in an uninformed manner, thereby exposing 
themselves to physical and emotional harm.”328 Second, sex trafficking is a 
criminal industry, driven by the economic theory of supply and demand.329 
While the federal government can prosecute those who seek commercial 
sex acts performed by minors (representing the “demand” in the 
commercial sex industry), investigating and prosecuting those who provide 
the supply constitutes a more effective method of preventing sex 
trafficking.330 Moreover, criminal enterprises do not exist in a vacuum. 
Human traffickers often participate in other crimes as well, such as drug 
trafficking.331 
                                                                                                                 
 322. Sexual Assault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 131 (9th ed. 2009); see MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.11(3)(a) (indicating that children cannot give effective consent because they are 
considered legally incompetent). 
 323. ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., LEWIN GRP., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS 
AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 6-7 (2004), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/sr/ 
statelaws/report.pdf; Statutory Rape, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (9th ed. 2009). 
 324. See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public 
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, app. (2003) (identifying states that impose 
strict liability through the public welfare offense model and hybrid model). 
 325. Id. at 345, app. (identifying states that require some scienter element to be convicted 
of statutory rape under the true crime model). 
 326. Id. at 334-35. 
 327. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012). 
 328. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 875. 
 329. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8; see Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 265-66 
(discussing “[t]he Business of Sex Trafficking”). 
 330. Contra Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 266-68. 
 331. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 77-78. 
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2. No Criminalization of Otherwise Legal Conduct 
There is another aspect to the comparison of statutory rape and sex 
trafficking that strengthens the argument for strict liability. In some cases, 
statutory rape laws may hold a person criminally liable for a felony even 
though he acted with an innocent mind.332 For example, a person could 
engage in consensual sexual activity with another whom he reasonably 
believed to be an adult based on the person’s statements and actions.333 In 
most states, criminal liability is imposed even if the minor claims to have 
consented because, legally, minors lack the capacity to consent.334 
Therefore, in some cases of statutory rape, what the defendant may have 
reasonably perceived as consensual, innocent conduct with a person of age 
becomes criminal through the imposition of strict liability based solely on 
the minor’s age.335 
The Supreme Court cautioned about this type of strict liability with 
crimes bearing significant punishment in United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc.336 The Court interpreted the statute prohibiting the shipping, 
receipt, distribution, or reproduction of child pornography as including a 
scienter requirement specifically because it was knowledge of the age of the 
person depicted in the pornography that distinguished “legal innocence 
from wrongful conduct.”337 In a statutory rape case, innocent conduct 
(where a defendant reasonably believed that the person was of age and was 
able to give valid consent) could lead to criminal liability without a mens 
rea requirement.338 
However, in the case of sex trafficking, the victim’s age does not 
distinguish legal innocence from wrongful conduct. Regardless of the 
victim’s age, the act of “recruit[ing], entic[ing], . . . transport[ing], 
provid[ing], obtain[ing], or maintain[ing] . . . a person” who will be caused 
“to engage in a commercial sex act” is a crime.339 While the federal statute 
requires force, fraud, or coercion to be convicted of sex trafficking if the 
                                                                                                                 
 332. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at app. 
 333. Id. at 335. Notably, statutory rape laws acknowledge that the minor may have 
participated consensually. Id. 
 334. Id. at 334. 
 335. Id. at 350. 
 336. 513 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1994). 
 337. Id. at 66, 73 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)). 
 338. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at 333 (“[E]ngaging in sexual activity is risky 
business. Implicit in the risk the actor assumes is that sexual intercourse, even between 
consenting adults, may be proscribed by statute.”). 
 339. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012); see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5609 (2004). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
704 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:665 
 
 
victim is over the age of eighteen, a defendant causing a person to engage 
in a commercial sex act without force, fraud, or coercion can often be 
prosecuted under anti-pimping or pandering laws at the state level.340 The 
underlying conduct of causing a person to engage in a commercial sex act is 
prohibited by law.341 There is no underlying innocent conduct. 
Critics of strict-liability crimes are often concerned with the concept of 
convicting a person of a serious crime without a culpable state of mind.342 
In a statutory rape case, it is easy to imagine the scenario of the nineteen-
year-old boy engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with a seventeen-
year-old girl who he reasonably believed was eighteen years old. This type 
of fact pattern may justify critics’ concerns about holding a person 
criminally liable for a felony that was committed without a culpable 
mind.343 But those concerns simply are not present in a sex trafficking case. 
Regardless of age or consent, the defendant must have a culpable state of 
mind. He must have the intent of causing the person to be engaged in a 
commercial sex act, an intent that must be proven by the prosecution.344 
Essentially, the minority status of the victim becomes a “‘jurisdictional 
fact’ that enhances an offense otherwise committed with an evil intent.”345 
Any concern that a defendant would be convicted of a serious felony 
without a culpable mind is misplaced. 
3. Congressional Intent 
In addition to considering the common law background against which 
the federal statute was passed, congressional intent must be considered 
when determining whether a strict liability standard should be adopted. 
When the bill amending 18 U.S.C. § 1591 passed in the House of 
Representatives, Congressman Berman explained that “the prosecution will 
be exempted from having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant who had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person . . . knew 
that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”346 The amendment was 
inspired by the Supreme Court’s footnote in X-Citement Video noting that 
                                                                                                                 
 340. See, e.g., W.VA. CODE § 61-8-8 (2010); see also sources cited supra n. 202 
 341. See, e.g., id. (prohibiting knowingly supporting oneself via a prostitute’s earnings). 
 342. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 279. 
 343. Id.; see Carpenter, supra note 324, at 340-41. 
 344. 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 
 345. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.3 (1994) (citing United 
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975)).  
 346. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard 
Berman). 
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the presumption of mens rea excludes sex offenses.347 Congressman 
Berman added that the decision to relieve the government of its burden of 
proving the defendant knew the victim was under the age of eighteen years 
brought the statute in line with similar criminal statutes, specifically the 
federal statutory rape statute found in the Mann Act, which is a strict 
liability felony when committed against a child less than twelve years of 
age.348 
In addition, the Congressional Research Service supports an 
interpretation of congressional support for strict liability by stating, “[The 
amendment] absolves the government from having to prove that a trafficker 
actually knew the age of a child victim, as long as it shows that he had a 
reasonable chance to observe the victim.”349 Based on the legislative 
history, Congress most likely intended § 1591 to hold the defendant strictly 
liable for the age of the victim.350 
Legislatures often resort to creating strict liability crimes when 
convictions are hard to obtain due to challenges in proving mens rea.351 
This may be especially true in human trafficking cases. In a national survey, 
prosecutors stated that a human trafficking case is “rarely successful” 
without victim testimony.352 A number of factors can impact whether a 
victim will testify, including fears of retaliation, threats to families,353 and 
other prosecutorial factors, such as lengths of sentences and likelihoods of 
conviction.354 
Testimony by children raises additional concerns. Children, while 
presumed competent,355 may have challenges communicating their 
                                                                                                                 
 347. Id.; see X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2. 
 348. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard 
Berman) (citing United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
 349. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40190, THE WILLIAM WILBERFORCE 
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008 (P.L. NO. 110-457): 
CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS 7 (2009), available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/ 
reference/additional-materials/vawa-legislative-history/trafficking-victims-protection-act-
and-reauthorization/congressional-research-service-reports-tvpa-and-tvpras/TVPRA%20 
CRS%20Report.pdf (last visited June 13, 2013). 
 350. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 351. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 273. 
 352. CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at vi. 
 353. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 83-84. 
 354. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs: 
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 94 (statement 
of Ms. Florrie Burke, Safe Haven). 
 355. FED. R. EVID. 601 (stating that every person is presumed to be competent, regardless 
of age). 
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testimony in an effective or credible manner.356 In addition, the impact of 
testifying on a child victim may create challenges in deciding whether a 
child victim should testify.357 Child victims of sexual assault were more 
likely to be re-traumatized by the process of testifying in criminal court, 
demonstrating signs of distress several months after the trial.358 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a compelling interest in 
“protect[ing] . . . minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and 
embarrassment.”359 Because of the impact on child victims and the resulting 
challenge in prosecuting a human trafficking case that relies significantly 
on victim testimony, the legislature may find a strict liability standard 
appropriate in sex trafficking of a minor cases. 
4. Public Support for the Adoption of the Strict Liability Standard 
Most public interest groups encourage the adoption of the strict liability 
standard for the age of the victim.360 The United Nations’ Model Law 
against Trafficking in Persons does not expressly require the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant knew that the person recruited was a minor.361 
Rather, force, fraud, or coercion is assumed when the victim is a child.362 
The prosecution must only prove exploitation—that the child was caused to 
participate in a commercial sex act.363 Any additional showing of the 
                                                                                                                 
 356. 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:116 
(3d ed. 2007). 
 357. Christianna M. Lamb, The Child Witness and the Law: The United States’ Judicial 
Response to the Commercial, Sexual Exploitation of Children in Light of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 3 OR. REV. INT’L L. 63, 70-71 (2001). 
 358. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Neither 
Party at *9, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478), 1990 WL 10013093, at 
*9 (“The testifying children’s distress was mainly manifested in greater depression, anxiety, 
and psychosomatic symptoms.”). 
 359. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); see also Craig, 
497 U.S. at 852 (collecting cases). 
 360. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MODEL LAW AGAINST 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 37 (2009) [hereinafter MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS], available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Model_Law_ 
against_TIP. pdf; Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human 
Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309, at 11; RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS: 
MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS, supra note 309, at 3. 
 361. See MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 360, at 37. 
 362. Id. (specifying human trafficking of a child without a mens rea element). 
 363. Id. at 35-36, 39 (defining “exploitation” and applying that definition to child 
victims). 
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defendant’s knowledge of the age of the minor is unnecessary.364 Similarly, 
the age of the victim may increase the sentencing range for the defendant 
simply “if . . . the circumstance[] [is] present.”365 
The Polaris Project, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to ending 
human trafficking, partners with the federal government and its entities 
through grant-funded programs.366 In addition to operating the National 
Human Trafficking Resource Center hotline, the Polaris Project often 
serves as a consultant for Congress and agencies within the federal 
government.367 Through its lobbying efforts, the Polaris Project advocates 
for adoption of model anti-trafficking laws.368 Citing statutory rape laws 
and international law, the model laws do not require a showing that the 
defendant knew the victim’s age.369 In commentary, the Polaris Project 
argued that the strict liability standard does not raise constitutional concerns 
when the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim 
because “there is no policy reason to protect those who . . . are aware they 
are supporting the commercial sexual exploitation of another person which 
is already a crime in most states.”370 
The National Institute on State Policy on Trafficking of Women and 
Girls of the Center for Women Policy Studies endorsed similar 
provisions.371 The age of the minor is a sentencing enhancement factor; the 
defendant need not know that the victim was under the age of eighteen 
years to either be convicted of sex trafficking or receive the sentencing 
enhancement.372 
                                                                                                                 
 364. See id. at 37 (specifying human trafficking of a child without a mens rea element). 
 365. Id. at 39. 
 366. See National Human Trafficking Resource Center, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www. 
polarisproject.org/what-we-do/national-human-trafficking-hotline/the-nhtrc/overview (last 
visited June 16, 2013). 
 367. See, e.g., Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking 
Programs: Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 
40-46 (statement of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project). 
 368. Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human 
Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/ 
capacity-building/model-provisions-of-comprehensive-state-legislation-to-combat-human-
trafficking (last visited July 7, 2013).  
 369. Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human 
Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309, at 11. 
 370. Id. 
 371. See RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE 
ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS, supra note 309. 
 372. Id. at 3.  
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In addition, a number of states have adopted the strict liability standard. 
Of the thirty-two jurisdictions with sex trafficking of minors statutes,373 
nineteen hold the defendant responsible for the minor’s age by either 
adopting the strict liability standard or prohibiting the defense of mistake of 
age.374 Only one state specifically requires the prosecution to prove the 
defendant knew the victim’s age.375 The remaining twelve jurisdictions with 
sex trafficking of minors statutes model their laws after the federal sex 
trafficking statutes, thereby embodying the inherent ambiguities.376 Eight 
states with trafficking statutes do not specify a different statute or penalty 
for those who traffic minors.377 The remaining eleven states do not have 
trafficking statutes and typically prosecute under a pandering, compelling 
prostitution, or kidnapping statute.378 
A strong majority supports the adoption of a strict liability standard for 
the mens rea of the age of the minor. A strict liability standard would 
facilitate more effective prosecutions and make greater strides towards 
abolishing the sex trafficking industry. However, the drawbacks to the strict 
liability standard must be considered as well. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 373. This number includes thirty-one states and the District of Columbia. 
 374. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-502 (2010); FLA. 
STAT. § 787.06 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-46 (2011); IOWA CODE § 710A.2 (2012); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5426 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.100 (West 2007); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 4A (2011); MINN. STAT. § 609.322 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.212 
(2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:7 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.13 (2006); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-40-01 (2009); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 867 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3002 
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-67-6 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-49-2 (2011); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-309 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-310 (West 2008). 
 375. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 787 (2007). 
 376. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1307 (2010); D.C. CODE § 22-1834 (2010); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/10-9 (2010); IND. CODE § 35-42-3.5-1 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.3 
(2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.462g (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-54.1 (2006); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 28-831 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-1 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
20A.02 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2652 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 948.051 (2011). 
 377. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-152 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.360 (2012); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-11-108 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-192a (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8 
(WEST 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.34 (McKinney 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.32 
(West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.100 (2011). 
 378. HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1203 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5609 (1994); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 17-A, § 301 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (WEST 2011); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-5-602 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.300 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.017 
(2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-415 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (2009); W. VA. CODE 
§ 61-8-8 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-103 (1993). 
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B. Concerns Weighing Against the Adoption of a Strict Liability Standard 
While the public outcry demands strict liability for sex trafficking,379 
long established principles of criminal law may prevent the adoption of a 
strict liability standard for this crime.380 
Offenses without a mens rea requirement “generally are disfavored.”381 
Common law requires some level of mens rea.382 A person cannot be 
punished for a crime at common law without at least acting with 
negligence.383 However, as statutory law has developed, strict liability has 
gained a strong foothold in certain types of crimes.384 Strict liability is often 
reserved for public welfare offenses385 or for crimes that carry a light 
penalty, usually less than one-year imprisonment, such as misdemeanors.386 
The Model Penal Code limits strict liability to violations punishable only by 
a civil penalty, such as a fine or forfeiture.387 Furthermore, the Model Penal 
Code dictates that strict liability should not be applied to offenses that give 
“rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a 
criminal offense.”388 Many scholars and commentators have expressed 
concerns about punishing a person without demonstrating a culpable state 
of mind.389 
The DOJ expressed these concerns regarding the proposed 2008 
amendment to the TVPA, stating that removing the knowledge requirement 
combined with the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years “would 
create a rare circumstance wherein there is a substantial mandatory 
minimum sentence for an already unusual strict liability crime.”390 While 
                                                                                                                 
 379. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4. 
 380. For example, at common law, strict liability crimes were prohibited. Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 
422, 436-37 (1978)). 
 381. Id. at 606 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)). 
 382. Id. at 605 (citing U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436). 
 383. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 272. 
 384. For example, strict liability is typical for “public welfare offenses” and statutory 
rape. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at 322-32. 
 385. Id. (discussing the public welfare offense doctrine from the perspective of its 
potential application to statutory rape laws). 
 386. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 272-73. 
 387. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (2011). 
 388. Id. 
 389. See, e.g., Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828 
(1999); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 
(1960). 
 390. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8. 
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not explicitly stated by Congress, these types of concerns may have 
motivated the changes made to Representative Smith’s original strict 
liability proposal.391 Concerns about imposing such a severe punishment of 
up to life imprisonment for a crime where the defendant neither knew the 
victim’s age nor had an opportunity to ascertain the victim’s age may have 
motivated the changes.392 
Moreover, not all prostitutes are coerced into the sex industry.393 Many 
enter the industry voluntarily.394 To impose strict liability on a defendant 
who panders a prostitute, who while age seventeen claims to be age twenty, 
would offend the idea of imposing punishment only on a person with a 
culpable state of mind.395 A defendant could reasonably believe that the 
person he is pandering is an adult.396 But that underlying conduct of 
pandering is still illegal.397 However, a defendant convicted of pandering 
may only face up to five years in prison compared with possible life 
imprisonment if convicted of sex trafficking.398 Such a difference in prison 
terms for the same conduct should not be accepted lightly.399 It would be 
unfair to impose such a significant increase in punishment on a person who 
reasonably believed that he was working with an adult.  
The DOJ also noted that the creation of a strict liability crime may lead 
to “legal challenges.”400 One defendant charged with sex trafficking 
advanced an Eighth Amendment challenge, alleging that the imposition of 
                                                                                                                 
 391. See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, supra note 129. 
 392. Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human 
Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309, at 11. 
 393. Ronald Weitzer, The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and 




 394. Id. 
 395. See Wasserstrom, supra note 389, at 731 (“The imposition of severe criminal 
sanctions in the absence of any requisite mental element has been held by many to be 
incompatible with the basic requirements of our Anglo-American, and, indeed, any civilized 
jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 396. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at 352. 
 397. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (West 2011). 
 398. Compare, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 4A (2011), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
4-103 (West 2013), with 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) (2012) (establishing punishment ranging from 
a minimum of ten years imprisonment to life imprisonment, based on the minor’s age). 
 399. See Michaels, supra note 389, at 841 (“[C]riminal punishment must be predicated 
on some independent culpability . . . .”). 
 400. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8. 
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strict liability constituted a violation of the constitutional protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment.401 Even though the Supreme Court has only 
held one strict liability crime unconstitutional,402 18 U.S.C. § 1591 should 
strive to embody the constitutional protections advanced by the framers of 
the Bill of Rights.403 Simply because the statute would probably not be held 
unconstitutional on Eighth Amendment grounds does not render strict 
liability necessary or appropriate for this type of felony. 
Principles of fairness may prevent the adoption of the strict liability 
standard. The philosophy on which the American criminal legal system is 
based dictates that strict liability should not be imposed for any felony, 
especially one with such a severe punishment.404 While not applying the 
strict liability standard may make prosecutions more challenging, 
embracing a fair and just criminal system should overcome the desire to 
ease the burden on the prosecution.405 
V. Proposed Changes to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 
After careful review of the arguments presented for and against strict 
liability for the age of the minor in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, 
the author proposes the following changes. 
First, the current language of § 1591(c) should be stricken from the 
statute. In its place, subsection (c) should read: 
In a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, the 
Government need not prove that the defendant knew or 
recklessly disregarded the fact that the person so recruited, 
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, 
had not attained the age of 14 years. If the person so recruited, 
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained 
had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of 
18 years, it is a defense, which the defendant must establish by a 
                                                                                                                 
 401. United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. 
July 27, 2010); see also supra text accompanying notes 98-101. The constitutional challenge 
was dismissed on ripeness grounds because the defendant had not yet been sentenced. 
Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *10-11. 
 402. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) (holding that strict liability 
was inappropriate in felon registration statute because of notice issues). 
 403. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957) (“[A] restrictive meaning 
must be given if a broader meaning would generate constitutional doubts.”). 
 404. Michaels, supra note 389, at 841. 
 405. See generally id. 
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preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant reasonably 
believed that the person had attained the age of 18 years. 
With this proposal, strict liability will be imposed if the victim is under 
the age of fourteen years. However, the government must prove that the 
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the age of the victim if the victim 
is at least fourteen years old but less than eighteen years old.406 If the victim 
was at least fourteen years old but less than eighteen years old, the 
defendant may defend on the basis that he reasonably believed the victim to 
be at least eighteen years old. These changes reflect a compromise between 
the opposing views on strict liability in this context while providing an 
effective platform for Congress to achieve its goals of eradicating sex 
trafficking. 
This compromise avoids the concerns resulting from severely punishing 
a defendant pandering a person—whom he reasonably believed to be an 
adult—who voluntarily entered the sex industry. The defendant in this 
situation could advance a reasonable mistake-of-age defense, which could 
be plausible when the minor is over the age of fourteen years.407 However, 
the plausibility of a reasonable mistake-of-age defense significantly 
decreases when the victim is less than fourteen years of age.408 Essentially, 
when the victim is less than fourteen years of age, it is no longer plausible 
that the victim entered the industry voluntarily or that the defendant 
reasonably believed the victim was at least eighteen years of age. 
Therefore, strict liability can be imposed without offending the concerns of 
punishing a person without a culpable state of mind.409 
While the reckless disregard mens rea may reach the same result as strict 
liability when the victim is under the age of fourteen years,410 the strict 
                                                                                                                 
 406. The age of fourteen years is selected because a girl typically experiences puberty by 
that time. See Puberty & Precocious Puberty: Overview, NAT’L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & 
HUMAN DEV., http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/puberty/Pages/default.aspx (last 
updated Apr. 3, 2013). During puberty, a girl experiences growth spurts and breast 
development, causing her appearance to resemble an adult. 
 407. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(g) (2012), codifies a reasonable mistake-of-age 
defense for the crime of transportation of minors. 
 408. The plausibility that a defendant reasonably believed a child less than fourteen years 
old was actually an adult diminishes because a reasonable person would not observe a child 
less than fourteen years old and believe she was an adult. In this case, the defendant can bear 
the “risk of error” if he unreasonably believes a young child is an adult. See United States v. 
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 76 n.5 (1994). 
 409. This situation avoids criminalizing otherwise legal conduct. See id. at 73. 
 410. Reckless disregard could probably be found by a showing that, because the victim 
was less than fourteen years of age, the defendant could not have reasonably believed that 
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liability standard promotes Congress’s goal of protecting the victim. Victim 
testimony is key to successful sex trafficking prosecutions.411 However, 
testifying can re-traumatize the victim, a risk that increases if the victim is a 
younger child.412 By imposing strict liability when the child is under the age 
of fourteen years, the child may not have to testify, or the amount of 
testimony required of the child may be reduced.413 Furthermore, cross-
examination of the child will be significantly limited. The victim’s conduct 
and actions become less important as the key element to prove will be 
whether the defendant caused the victim to engage in a commercial sex 
activity. For example, the victim will not need to testify about her 
reputation or prior sexual history (or lack thereof). Rather, her testimony 
will be limited to the commercial sex activity itself. With less testimony 
required from the child, the trauma on the child will be reduced. Therefore, 
Congress’s goal of prosecution can be advanced, while focus remains on 
the protection of the child-victim. 
The above compromise also brings § 1591 more closely in line with 
current statutes.414 Congress specifically cited 18 U.S.C. § 2241 as 
inspiration for its draft of § 1591.415 Subsection (d) of § 2241 imposes strict 
liability for the offense of aggravated sexual abuse by relieving the 
government of its burden to prove that the defendant knew the victim was 
younger than twelve years old.416 However, this subsection has not raised 
the concern that a defendant could reasonably believe the person engaged in 
the sexual act was an adult because the age at which strict liability is 
imposed is less than twelve years old.417 Also, § 2241 requires the 
defendant know that the person was not an adult, as opposed to offering the 
option of proving that the defendant recklessly disregarded the person’s 
age.418 While § 1591 was inspired by § 2241, the differences in the statutes 
                                                                                                                 
the victim was an adult. See, e.g., Special Verdict Form, United States v. Robinson, No. 09-
CR-794 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010) (finding that the defendant recklessly disregarded the age 
of the minor when she was seventeen years of age). 
 411. See CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at vi. 
 412. See Lamb, supra note 357, at 70-71. 
 413. Because the government would not be required to prove the defendant knew or 
recklessly disregarded the minor’s age, the government may be able to present evidence 
other than the child victim’s testimony to prove the other elements. 
 414. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2423 (2012). 
 415. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard 
Berman). 
 416. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 
 417. See id. 
 418. Id. § 2241(c). 
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have led to the concerns raised by the current version of § 1591. The 
proposed compromise makes § 1591 more consistent with § 2241 by 
lowering the age of the victim at which strict liability is imposed from 
eighteen years of age to fourteen years of age. 
The reasonable mistake-of-age defense was inspired by 18 U.S.C. § 
2423.419 Criminalizing the transportation of minors with the intent to 
engage in illicit sexual conduct or criminal sexual activity under § 2423 
requires that the defendant have knowledge that the person transported was 
a minor.420 The reasonable mistake-of-age defense is included to avoid 
punishing those who reasonably believed the person transported was an 
adult.421 Similar scenarios could arise with cases charged under § 2423 and 
§ 1591.422 For example, the person transported or caused to engage in a 
commercial sex activity could assert that she is an adult by stating her age 
as older than eighteen years or by participating in activities typically 
reserved for adults, such as purchasing alcohol or cigarettes. In these cases, 
it would be unfair to impose such an increase in punishment when the 
defendant reasonably believed the person was an adult. By including a 
reasonable mistake-of-age defense in the proposed compromise, that 
scenario can be avoided. 
Finally, the above compromise represents the best statutory scheme to 
further Congress’s goal of prosecuting severe forms of trafficking while 
appeasing those on both sides of the political issue. Those who advance the 
strict liability standard will see that those who traffic children younger than 
fourteen years of age are justly punished without offending the principles of 
those who believe that a person should not be punished without a culpable 
state of mind. The proposed compromise will be less likely to succumb to 
constitutional challenges because the same result under a strict liability 
standard could be met with a reckless disregard standard, albeit with more 
implications for the victim.423 
The proposed compromise seeks to balance the arguments for and 
against strict liability while remaining dedicated to the TVPA’s goals of 
protection, prevention, and prosecution. By imposing strict liability only 
against those defendants trafficking children younger than age fourteen, the 
goal of protecting the victim is served by not requiring extensive testimony 
                                                                                                                 
 419. See id. § 2423(g). 
 420. See id. § 2423(a), (b). 
 421. See id. 
 422. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 423. For example, under the reckless disregard standard, the child victim would most 
likely be required to testify. See CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at vi. 
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from the child. Additionally, requiring the prosecution to prove the 
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the victim’s age when the victim 
is older than age fourteen avoids the concerns regarding the imposition of 
strict liability for a severe felony on a less culpable mind.424 With an 
unambiguous federal statute, the goal of prevention can be met through 
effective prosecutions of sex traffickers, thereby taking a necessary step 
toward abolishing sex trafficking. 
VI. Conclusion 
Lydia, Lina, and Tina425 are fortunate survivors of sex trafficking. Lydia 
was eventually recognized as a victim of sex trafficking and given the 
services she needed, although her traffickers were never charged with sex 
trafficking.426 Lina managed to escape with the help of her friend, Sinan.427 
With the help of the International Justice Mission and the Siem Reap Anti-
Human Trafficking Police, the other women and children kept in the same 
brothel were rescued and all received care and counseling.428 Tina escaped 
from her life of forced prostitution and currently advocates on behalf of 
victims of sex trafficking.429 
Congress’s three goals of protection, prevention, and prosecution are 
aimed at preventing children, like Lydia, Lina, and Tina, from living these 
horrendous stories.430 While there may be disagreements on how to 
effectuate these goals, parties on both sides of the argument agree on one 
thing: no person or child should be forced to engage in a commercial sex 
activity.431 In its current ambiguous state, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 does not 
advance the goals of prevention, protection, and prosecution. Each year that 
§ 1591 remains ambiguous, an estimated 100,000 children in the United 
States are taken from their homes and forced into the commercial sex 
                                                                                                                 
 424. The defendant would be less culpable because he reasonably believed the person 
trafficked was an adult. However, the defendant could still be prosecuted under other 
statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), if force, fraud, or coercion was used. 
 425. See discussion supra Part I. 
 426. 146 CONG. REC. H26831 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Chris Smith).  
 427. IJM Cambodia: Brave Survivors Help Rescue Girls from Brothel, supra note 11. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Frundt, supra note 28. 
 430. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 
Stat. 1464, 1466-69. 
 431. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012); MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS, supra note 360; Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat 
Human Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309; RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE 
LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS, supra note 309. 
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industry.432 The power to eradicate the second-largest criminal industry in 
the world lies within Congress’s reach. By amending § 1591 to eliminate 
ambiguities, Congress can advance its goals of preventing a child from 
being taken from her home and forced to endure the pain and suffering of 
being trafficked into the sex industry, protecting the children that have 
already been trafficked, and prosecuting those who engage in this heinous 
crime. 
 




                                                                                                                 
 432. Smith et al., supra note 253, at iv. 
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